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Summary 
The video game poses a challenge in terms of copyright protection due to 
the complexity and novelty of its nature, in essence being comprised of 
multiple copyrightable elements, resulting in jurisdictionally diverse legal 
classification and harmonisation within the EU is not yet achieved. As the 
varying options of copyright classification of  video game affects the 
applicability of EU anti-circumvention law, and thus, the evaluation of 
digital rights management-systems, which is an important part of this thesis, 
clarification was called for. It was found that there are indications that a 
video game should not be considered a mere computer program, but rather a 
complex amalgamation of intellectual works. 
 
The rapid technological development has made it comparably easy to gain 
unauthorised access to and use of copyrighted content, resulting in a 
growing illegal consumption of video games. To counter this, right holders 
implement digital rights management-systems (DRM-systems) to protect 
and manage their exclusive rights through restricting or preventing 
unauthorised access and use. Of tools used, technological protection 
measures (TPMs) in particular are from a lawful end-user perspective 
perceived as over-restrictive, complicating and limiting the access and the 
use of the video game, including acts that do not require right holder 
authorisation. In light of this, the impact of implemented DRM-systems, 
TPMs in particular, on illegal consumption and end-user’s attitudes is 
illustrated and the de facto effectiveness of TPMs evaluated. It is argued that 
TPMs are not truly effective in preventing illegal consumption – indeed 
some scholars suggest that TPMs might even increase the magnitude of 
copyright infringement following increasing levels of discontent within the 
video gaming community.  
 
Another aspect to the implementation of DRM-systems, specifically TPMs, 
is the potential conflict created as the right holder’s fundamental right of 
property is pitted against the end-user’s fundamental right of freedom of 
expression and information. This called for the application of a fundamental 
rights perspective, investigating whether TPMs may be interfering with end-
users fundamental rights and, if so, whether it is considered a violation or 
not. It is shown that TPMs can interfere with the right of freedom of 
expression and information, but so far relevant case law implies that such 
interference is not considered a violation, in part due to the wide margin of 
appreciation awarded EU Member States. However, current case law does 
not seem entirely preclude that as a possible future outcome. 
 
In conclusion, TPMs does not only inconvenience lawful end-users whilst 
being de facto ineffective in preventing illegal consumption of video games, 
but TPMs also interferes with end-user fundamental rights, although 
violation has not been confirmed. It is thus proposed that TPMs in their 
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current format may not be the preferred solution to counter video game 
piracy and ensure right holder exclusive rights. 
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Sammanfattning 
Dator- och TV-spel är relativt nyligen introducerade och komplext 
utformade verk, vilket innebär en utmaning avseende upphovsrättsligt 
skydd. I huvudsak består ett sådant spel av ett flertal olika upphovsrättsliga 
alster, inkluderande programvaran, som är oupplösligt sammansatta i en och 
samma produkt. Detta leder till att den upphovsrättsliga klassificeringen 
varierar beroende på aktuell jurisdiktion, då harmonisering ännu inte har 
uppnåtts inom EU avseende sådana verk. Den upphovsrättsliga 
klassificeringen av dator- och TV-spel påverkar tillämpligheten av EU:s 
upphovsrättsliga skyddsåtgärdslagstiftning och därmed även utvärderingen 
av de elektroniska system (DRM-system) som används för att förvalta 
digitala rättigheter. Då denna utvärdering utgör en signifikant del i detta 
arbete, var ett försök till klargörande påkallat. Det visades att det föreligger 
indikationer på att dator- och TV-spel inte bör betraktas som enbart 
programvara, utan snarare bedömas vara en komplex sammanslagning av 
olika intellektuella verk. 
 
Den snabba tekniska utvecklingen har gjort det jämförelsevis lätt att få 
obehörig tillgång till och nyttja upphovsrättsskyddat material, vilket 
resulterat i en växande illegal konsumtion av dator- och TV-spel. För att 
motverka detta och skydda sina ensamrätter nyttjar rättighetshavare vissa 
system för elektronisk förvaltning av digitala rättigheter, DRM-system, 
avsedda att begränsa eller helt förhindra obehörig åtkomst och användning. 
Av de rättsligt skyddade verktyg som används uppfattas särskilt de tekniska 
skyddsåtgärderna (TPMs) av legitima slutanvändare som alltför restriktiva 
då de både begränsar åtkomst till och komplicerar användningen av dator- 
och TV-spelet, inbegripet handlingar som inte kräver rättsinnehavarens 
tillstånd. Effekten av implementerade DRM-system, särskilt TPMs, på den 
illegala konsumtionen och på slutanvändarnas attityder illustreras som ett 
led i utvärderingen av de facto effektiviteten av TPMs. Det hävdas att TPMs 
inte tillräckligt effektivt förhindrar den illegala konsumtionen, och vissa 
forskare vill även mena att användandet av TPMs kan öka omfattningen av 
upphovsrättsintrång, sprunget ur ett växande missnöje med dessa inom 
dator- och TV-spelar forum. 
 
En annan aspekt av implementering av DRM-system, särskilt TPMs, är den 
potentiella konflikt som uppkommer genom att rättighetshavarens 
fundamentala rätt till egendom ställs mot slutanvändarens fundamentala rätt 
till yttrande- och informationsfrihet. Detta berättigade en utredning av 
huruvida TPMs gör intrång i slutanvändarens fundamentala rättigheter, och, 
om så är fallet, ifall detta kan anses utgöra en otillåten kränkning. Det 
framkommer att TPMs kan anses göra intrång i rätten till yttrande- och 
informationsfrihet, men rådande rättspraxis finner inte att sådana intrång 
innebär otillåten kränkning, men verkar däremot inte helt prekludera denna 
möjlighet. 
 4 
Sammanfattningsvis, TPMs medför inte bara besvär för legitima 
slutanvändare, utan de är även inte de facto effektiva i att förhindra illegal 
konsumtion av dator- och TV-spel. Därutöver inkräktar TPMs på 
slutanvändares fundamentala rättigheter, om än det idag inte ses som en 
otillåten kränkning. Därför synes TPMs i nuvarande utformning inte vara en 
optimal lösning för att motverka illegal konsumtion och skydda 
rättighetshavarens ensamrätt.  
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Intellectual Property Rights 
UN  United Nations 
WCT  WIPO Copyright Treaty 
WIPO  World Intellectual property Organization 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Video games pose a challenge as regards copyright protection due to the 
complexity and novelty of its nature. Video games of today are indeed 
complex work of authorship and, more often than not, are comprised of 
multiple copyrighted works. At the very least, any video game contain 
audiovisual parts, (e.g. pictures, video recording and sound), and software 
which essentially manages the audiovisual elements. In terms of the 
applicable legal approach, this inherent complexity results in jurisdictional 
diversity.
1
 In other words, there are multiple legal classification options 
available for video games. As regards copyright classification and 
applicable EU law, two directives in particular are of interest, the Software 
Directive
2
, applicable to computer programs, and the InfoSoc Directive
3
, 
applicable to a variety of intellectual works and related rights. 
 
In a relatively short time span, video games have become an increasingly 
popular form of entertainment and a promising platform for creativity and 
innovation as well as a multibillion-dollar industry.
4
 The increase in 
popularity and economic value naturally makes the legal rights attached to 
video games more important than ever, and increased harmonisation and 
legal clarity is in demand. In addition, the rapid technological development, 
particularly as relates to the internet, has made circumvention of copyright 
protection easy and widespread and the result is a rising need to effectively 
protect copyrighted works. This has spurred the development of digital 
rights management (DRM) systems in order to ensure that right holders can 
manage their digital rights and exercise their exclusive rights.
5
 A DRM-
system is a combination of electronic management and content protection, 
and it utilises technological, organisational and other means to control the 
use of digital works. Anything from basic copy protection to more complex 
systems controlling distribution and end-user consumption of content, for 
example by means of licensing- and payment-systems, are examples of 
DRM.
6
 Legally speaking, a distinction is made between rights management 
information (RMI) and technological protection measures (TPMs), although 
both are parts of DRM-systems.
7
  According to article 7 of the InfoSoc 
Directive, rights management information is defined as any electronic 
“information provided by right holders which identifies the work or other 
                                                 
1
 WIPO webpage, IP: Video Games. 
2
 Software Directive, 2009/24/EC. 
3
 Information Society (InfoSoc) Directive, 2001/29/EC. 
4
 Jervell, Catherine, Video Games: 21st Century Art, WIPO Magazine, August 2012. 
5
 Bhatt, Vidyadhar, Is Digital Rights Management an IPR?, Journal of Library and 
Information Technology, Vol. 28, No. 5, September 2008 (Bhatt), p. 39-40. 
6
 Still, Viveka, DRM och upphovsrättens obalans, IPR University Center, Oy Nordprint 
AB: Helsinki, 2007 (Still), p. 2. 
7
 Still, p. 3. 
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subject matter, the author or any other right holder, or information about the 
terms and conditions of use, [...] and any numbers or codes that represent 
such information”.8 Member states are required to “provide adequate legal 
protection” for rights management information.9 Furthermore, article 6 of 
said directive obligates member states to “provide adequate legal protection 
against circumvention of effective technological protection measures”.10 
Essentially, TPMs are technological devices or tools that prevent or hinder 
unauthorised or illegal access to intellectual works, as well as copying or 
reproduction of said works.
11
 An example would be encryption built into 
gaming consoles that can only be decrypted through an information 
exchange with a medium, such as a cartridge or CD, containing the 
decryption key.  
 
However, TPMs, incorporated in video games are often perceived as over 
restrictive and intrusive by legitimate end-users.
12
 As the discontent of end-
users grow, so does the extent of illegal consumption of unauthorised video 
game copies, raising questions as to whether DRM, in its current form, is 
effectively protecting the exclusive rights of right holders or if it creates 
discontented end-users. Further, as such DRM restricts end-user access to 
and use of a legitimately bought game, questions pertaining to conflicting 
fundamental rights of the right holders, i.e. right to property, and the end-
user’s fundamental rights of freedom of expression and information, arise. 
Essentially, one asks oneself whether the permitted level of DRM within the 
EU interferes with the fundamental rights of the end-user or not. 
 
1.2 Purpose and questions 
The primary purpose of the thesis is to critically examine the EU anti-
circumvention law pertaining to DRM, and in particular TPMs, its 
applicability regarding video games and the de facto effect and effectiveness 
of the current regulation in this context, focusing on conflicting interests of 
right holders and end-users. I aim to examine and clarify how the relevant 
legal EU regulation relates to copyrighted videogames and what impact the 
legal approach to copyright protection and DRM-systems have in reality, 
especially on end-users. 
 
The secondary purpose is to establish whether these DRM-systems, 
specifically TPMs, inherently create a conflict between right holders 
fundamental right to their intellectual work and the end-users fundamental 
rights of freedom of expression and information. If such interference is 
                                                 
8
 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society (InfoSoc Directive), article 7(2). 
9
 InfoSoc directive, article 7(1). 
10
 InfoSoc directive, article 6(1). 
11
 InfoSoc directive, article 6. ? 
12
 Wilson, Arlene, Digital Rights Management – An Overview, Business Law Review, 
January 2010 (Wilson), p. 7. 
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indeed deemed to take place, then the question is whether that interference 
is justifiable or not. 
 
The questions that have been formulated to guide the research are as 
follows:  
 
1. How do TPMs affect end-users and are TPMs de facto effective? 
2. Can the use of DRM-systems, in particular TPMs, interfere with 
end-users’ fundamental right to freedom of expression and 
information, and, if so, is it considered a violation or not? 
 
1.3 Method and material 
Initially, it should be noted that I myself am an avid gamer, which partly 
explains my interest in this subject matter. It is therefore not unimaginable 
that my personal experience as an end-user of video games affects how I 
interpret the material used, although my aim is to be critical and objective.  
 
The method applied throughout the thesis is traditional legal method in the 
sense that primary and secondary sources of law within the EU, i.e. relevant 
directives and conventions in combination with relevant EU case law and 
doctrine, are analysed. The focal point is EU law, but as appropriate national 
Member State legislation and international agreements are studied. Due to 
the nature of the subject matter, the discussion is not limited to a strict de 
jure approach and subsequently the issue is also approached in terms of the 
de facto impact. 
 
By way of contrasting right holder interests with end-user interests, when 
appropriate, throughout the thesis, their potentially opposing perspectives 
are used to present the core arguments in the debate on DRM-systems. 
 
Further on, a fundamental rights perspective is adopted and an evaluation of  
the relevant provisions of primary law sources, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and applicable protocols, the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) and case-law from the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), is performed. 
 
Concerning the de facto impact of examined  DRM-systems on video game 
piracy and end-users actions as well as the prevalent attitudes within the 
gaming community, the approach is, in part, based on a non-legal discourse. 
This becomes apparent as regards the discussion on the underlying reasons 
for illegal consumption and the choices made by both end-users and right-
holders.   
 
Apart from select primary sources, such as treaties, directives, conventions, 
national legislation and applicable case law, a rather substantial number of 
secondary sources are used, mainly peer-reviewed articles and relevant 
literature. The articles I have used primarily adhere from different 
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intellectual property journals, for example Nordiskt Immateriellt 
Rättsskydd, European Intellectual Property Review and Intellectual Property 
Quarterly.  
 
The international intergovernmental organisation World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO), which concerns itself with the clarification 
of intellectual property law and aims to strike a balance between right holder 
privileges and end-user freedom, has, apart from establishing certain 
relevant treaties, also conducted studies and handbooks on the subject of 
copyright. Particularly one recent study
13
 on the legal status of video games 
has been examined alongside the WIPO Handbook on Copyright.  
 
In terms of secondary online sources, a few have been examined which 
cannot be considered traditional legal sources. Examples are online websites 
and blogs, dedicated to discussions on intellectual property law, video 
gaming and/or DRM. The purpose of using these untraditional sources is to 
get a sense of the ongoing discussion in the gaming community pertaining 
to right holder’s use of DRM and its impact on end-users. In particular, 
these sources have been used to exemplify and explain the dynamics 
between the right holders and the end users and when discussing end-users 
attitudes towards DRM these blogs and websites have been particularly 
useful.  
 
When searching for relevant material, online legal search engines and the 
law faculty library have mainly been utilised. Available research literature, 
specifically focused on video game piracy and the related legal 
complications, is limited whilst information on other digital products is 
available to a higher degree. Unsurprisingly, it has not been easy finding 
material that specifically targets the narrow topic of copyrighted video 
games and DRM. However, even though the novelty of the legal subject 
matter of video games and attached copyright partly complicated the 
research insofar that the number of traditional sources addressing the 
particular issue were limited, it also resulted in the majority of relevant 
material being current and up to date.  
 
1.4 Terminology 
The general definition of the term video game is “a game played 
electronically manipulating images produced by a computer program on a 
monitor or other display”.14 In general terms, when talking about video 
games one is therefore referring to a type of electronic game which is not 
inherently locked to a specific platform. In other words, a video game could 
be a computer game (e.g. for PC or Mac) or a game playable only on a 
                                                 
13
 Ramos, Andy et.al., The Legal Status of Video Games: Comparative Analysis in National 
approaches, July 29 2013 WIPO. 
14
 Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of video game (online source).  
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particular gaming console (e.g. for Xbox, Playstation and Wii). Throughout 
the thesis, this is the intended connotation of “video game”. 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
The scope of the thesis is limited to the intellectual work that is video games 
and the analysis is limited to the right holder perspective and the end-user 
perspective.  
 
The study is primarily focused on EU legislation, but comparisons will, 
when appropriate, be made with national and international regulation. 
 
Although competition law most definitely could be of interest, insofar as the 
implications of digital right management on the European market are 
concerned, it is a different field of law and as such will not be examined. 
 
Concerning the discussion on fundamental rights and DRM, it is limited to 
the conflict between the right of property and the right of freedom of 
expression and information. Naturally, there are other fundamental rights 
which could potentially be of interest, however it would not be feasible to 
thoroughly examine more than the selected rights within the scope of this 
thesis. One such example which could be interesting to discuss would be the 
right to protection of personal data, but that discussion is deliberately left 
outside the scope of the thesis. 
 
It is presumed that the reader is relatively conversant on the legal topic of 
intellectual property law, especially copyright. The thesis is focused on EU 
law and it is recommended for any reader to possess basic  knowledge of the 
structure of EU law, how it correlates with member states and interact with 
international law. For example, that there is a legal doctrine of primacy of 
EU law, which entails that EU law precedes over national member state law 
and that member states must comply with adopted and ratified directives, is 
knowledge that the reader is presumed to possess. 
 
1.6 Disposition 
The structure is one of consecutive presentation of relevant information and 
analysis of said information. The thesis is not divided into parts of strictly 
objective information presentation followed by chapters entirely comprised 
of analysis, on the contrary, the chapters are structured around the different 
themes presented in the first chapter and incorporates both facts and 
analysis. 
 
In the first chapter the topic and aim of the thesis as well as the main 
question formulations, terminology, necessary delimitations and overall 
structure of the thesis is presented. 
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The second chapter provides a basic introduction to the legal framework as 
regards copyright and video games within the EU and certain relevant 
international agreements. The chapter then expands on the actual 
classification of video games in terms of EU copyright. To achieve this, 
certain relevant directives, conventions and agreements already mentioned 
are presented in greater detail. The last part of the chapter deals with DRM, 
expanding upon what the term entails and what its legal basis within the EU 
is. 
 
Chapter three then addresses the recently issued opinion of Advocate-
General (AG) Sharpston regarding the preliminary ruling of the case 
Nintendo v PC Box. At a first glance it might seem excessive to devote an 
entire chapter to this one preliminary ruling, however as the opinion 
represents a recent and slightly new take on EU anti-circumvention law, 
specifically concerning TPMs and video games, and addresses the 
importance of proportionality and fair balance between copyright and other 
rights as well as other relevant legal questions, an extensive examination is 
justified.  
 
The fourth chapter presents arguments supporting the use of DRM-systems 
and discusses potential drawbacks of TPMs, with the aim to illustrate the 
end-user attitudes towards those as well as possible reasons for 
circumvention. Further, the de facto effectiveness of TPMs as a 
countermeasure for video game piracy will be discussed. Due to the nature 
of the issue, the strict legal approach is departed from in favour of empirical 
studies and non-legal sources. 
 
Chapter five addresses the core issue of balancing the fundamental rights of 
copyright holders with the fundamental rights of end-users. The right to 
property will be weighed against the right to freedom of expression and 
information through comparison of legal provisions, doctrine and case law. 
 
Finally, in chapter six, the questions presented in chapter one are, following 
the analyses in previous chapters, answered and conclusions are drawn.  
 13 
2 Copyright law, video games 
and DRM 
2.1 International agreements  
The Berne Convention is the foundation for copyright internationally and 
within the European Union and was established in the 1886. The convention 
asserts the exclusive right of the author to his or her own literary or artistic 
work, or more specifically, as formulated in article 2(1), the author’s “every 
production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be its 
mode or form of its expression”. 15 The convention provides the author with 
the exclusive right to reproduce the work, according to article 9, whilst other 
important issues, for example distribution, are left entirely unaddressed. 
Further, article 5(1) states that authors “[...] enjoy, in respect of works for 
which they are protected under this Convention, in countries of the Union 
other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do 
now or may hereafter grant to their nationals”. Article 20 expressly states 
that it is only permissible for Member States to conclude special agreements 
if such agreements grant authors more extensive rights than the Berne 
Convention itself and do not provide contrary provisions. 
 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was enacted 1994 and raised the 
standards of internationally mandatory protection for intellectual property 
rights beyond the level prescribed by the Berne Convention.
16
 However, 
TRIPS was created in the early 1990’s when the full potential of digital 
communication was unknown and therefore it does not address the issues 
related to copyright and the World Wide Web.
17
 As a response to this, two 
treaties were adopted in 1996 by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), both addressing the demands made by the increased 
digitisation on copyright and related rights.
18
 WIPO itself is a specialised 
intergovernmental agency within the United Nations (UN) system of 
organisation.
19
 Its purpose is to promote “the creation, dissemination, use 
and protection of works of the human mind for economic, cultural and 
social progress of all mankind”. It aims to strike a balance between 
sufficiently protecting rights of the authors and granting access to the socio-
                                                 
15
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, September 9, 1886, 
articles 5, 9 & 20. 
16
 Kur, Anette & Dreier, Thomas, European Intellectual Property Law text, cases & 
materials, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013, (Kur & Dreier) p. 25. 
17
 Kur, & Dreier, p. 32. 
18
 Cvetovski, Trajce, Copyright and popular media: liberal villains and technological 
change, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, (Cvetovski) p. 60. 
19
 WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook, WIPO publication No. 489 (E), Second edition, 
2008, (WIPO Handbook) p. 14. 
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economic and cultural benefits of such works worldwide.
20
 The two 
abovementioned WIPO treaties are considered to be special agreements 
pursuant article 20 of the Berne Convention and as such are available to all 
the Convention’s contracting parties.21 The more relevant of the two treaties 
is the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), which addresses what WIPO refers 
to as the ‘Digital Agenda’ and is essentially a reaction to the need to clarify 
existing norms and to create new norms if necessary, particularly 
concerning the issues of digitisation and the internet. Its provisions covers 
the applicable rights for the storage and transmission of works in digital 
systems, exceptions to and limitations on the rights in the digital 
environment, technological protection measures and rights management 
information.
22
 In accordance with both the Berne Convention and TRIPS, 
article 10 of the WCT states that the limitation and exceptions to the rights 
stipulated in WCT utilises the “three-step” test and therefore permissible 
limitations and exceptions are limited to “certain special cases that do not 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”.23Furthermore, contracting 
parties are also obliged to supply legal protection of technological 
protection measures.
24
 According to article 11, contracting parties are 
required to provide “[...] adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against circumvention of effective technological measures that are 
used by authors in connection with the exercise with the rights under this 
treaty or the Berne Convention and that restricts acts, in respect of their 
works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by 
law.”25 The application of such measures and information are left to the 
right holders.
26
 The other mentioned WIPO treaty is the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), however, as it concerns 
performances and phonograms it is not relevant to the subject matter at 
hand.
27
 
 
2.2 EU copyright law 
First and foremost, copyright law protects literary and artistic work of 
certain originality and since copyright protection is dependant on the 
principle of territoriality, copyrighted works are governed by the national 
regulations of the concerned Member State. Essentially, copyrighted work is 
protected by different laws in each Member State.
28
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Furthermore, according to article 295 of the EC Treaty, the European 
Community lacks direct competence to legislate the field of copyright law, 
which further enforces that intellectual property law is a matter of national 
law. Apart from when legislation is enacted on the grounds of article 308 of 
the same directive, which confers the so-called implied powers, the 
harmonisation of copyright law rests on article 95, intended to favour and 
reinforce market integration. This implies that the main goal, in terms of 
harmonisation, is to remove differences between national legislation that 
hinders the free movement of goods or causes distorted conditions of 
completion.
29
 
 
It is only recently that harmonisation of European national copyright law 
has begun. Harmonisation was for a long time held back because of 
differing territorial cultural stances on copyright as well as language 
barriers. Perhaps even more importantly, the trans-border copyright 
protection did not use to be of great economic value, unlike today, and thus, 
harmonisation of copyright law within Europe was not prioritised. The 
arrival of computer programs, databases, technological advances and, most 
notably, the internet changed the scene and as access to and unauthorised 
sharing of copyright protected works online became all too easy, the need 
for reliable trans-border protection of copyrighted works grew and became a 
priority to right holders. However, full harmonisation of copyright law is 
still a work in progress.
30
 As of today, no less than seven copyright 
directives have been adopted.
31
 As regards video games the following 
directives are of particular importance. 
 
2.2.1 Software Directive (2009/24/EC) 
What separates a video game from other copyrightable works, such as a 
painting or a piece of music, is not only that it is comprised of many 
different intellectual works, but also that it inevitably has one vital 
component that traditional intellectual works do not; a computer program, a 
core element in the creation of a video game. 
 
The development of computer software is often expensive and time-
consuming while the end-result can easily, and generally at an insignificant 
cost, be reproduced. Consequently, authors need easily attainable and 
verifiable exclusive legal protection that copyright, by its very nature, 
grants. Computer programs are legally protected against unauthorised 
copying, for private use or sharing, as well as from unauthorised adaptations 
of said program made by competitors. Subsequently, the Directive on the 
legal protection of computer programs 2009/24/EC
32
 (Software Directive) 
recognises computer programs as a new subject matter of intellectual 
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creation, despite being fundamentally functional.
33
 The directive stipulates 
that member states must protect computer programs as literary works under 
the Berne convention and attach copyright.
34
 The directive does not 
expressly define the term “computer program”, but according to recital 14, 
logic, algorithms and programming language are not protected to the extent 
that they comprise ideas and principles.
35
  
 
The exclusive rights are presented in article 4(1) and exhaustion of 
distribution rights are stated in article 4(2). Article 6 then presents the 
limitations on the exclusive rights for the benefit of legitimate users (“lawful 
acquirers”) – for example, legitimate users are allowed to make back-up 
copies when necessary.
36
 In addition, article 7 obliges member states to 
provide certain remedies as regards infringement, which includes a limited 
form of anti-circumvention protection.
37
 
 
2.2.2 InfoSoc Directive (2001/29/EC) 
The Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society, referred to as the 
InfoSoc Directive, represents a new more encompassing horizontal 
approach to harmonisation of copyright law, even though it does not replace 
earlier copyright directives.
38,39
 Up until the enactment of this directive, the 
predominant approach to copyright within the EU was sectorial in that each 
directive handled individual categories of intellectual works, individual 
rights or other particular issues. The InfoSoc Directive was initially meant 
to deal solely with copyright implications with the internet, but many of its 
provisions, for example its definition of the reproduction right in article 2, 
are generally applicable. In terms of harmonisation, one might say that the 
InfoSoc Directive is the first real step towards an EU-wide copyright code.
40
 
Several different essential rights are harmonised in this directive, for 
example, reproduction and distribution rights and other right holder 
exclusive rights, as well as limitations to these rights and protection of 
technological measures and rights management information. It is also clear 
that already in article 1(2) the InfoSoc Directive leaves the Software 
Directive intact.
41
  
 
Article 2 stipulates that “Member States must provide for the exclusive right 
to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent 
reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or part: (a) for 
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authors, of their works; [...]”. Article 3 then grant authors the exclusive right 
to communicate their intellectual works to the public.
42
 This means that 
authors of works have a right to authorise or prohibit any communication of 
their works to the public, by wire or wireless means. This includes making 
their works available to the public in such a way that members of the public 
can gain access to the works from a place and at a time individually chosen 
by them.
43
 The right to distribute these works is exclusively awarded to the 
authors in article 4. Essentially, without authorisation from the right holder, 
the public is not allowed to reproduce, communicate or distribute an 
intellectual work. However, there are exceptions to these rules, as listed in 
article 5. Article 5(1) stipulates that acts of temporary reproduction, being 
transient or incidental and an integral and essential part of a technological 
process and whose sole purpose is to enable either a transmission in a 
network between third parties by an intermediary or a lawful use, is exempt 
from the reproduction right in article 2. The reproduction must additionally 
not have any independent economic significance and must fit into one of the 
categories (a-e) in article 5(2).
44
 One such exemption occurs when a 
reproduction is made by publicly accessible libraries and certain other 
establishments, for example museums or archives, under the precondition 
that it is not for direct or indirect economic or commercial 
advantage.
45
Additionally, article 6 and 7 addresses the legal protection of 
technical protection measures and rights management information.
46
 
 
Further, the InfoSoc Directive implements the international WIPO treaty 
WCT.
47
 According to Kur and Dreier, the directive, in certain aspects, even 
go beyond the obligations of the treaty.
48
 For example, article 6 prohibits 
both the act of circumvention and of manufacturing and distribution of 
circumvention devices, which they view as a broadening of anti-
circumvention protection. The concerned WIPO treaties only provide anti-
circumvention protection to the extent that intellectual works are protected 
by copyright and not exempt due to limitations and exceptions, but no such 
limitations or exceptions exists in the InfoSoc Directive.
49
 In greater detail, 
article 6(1) states that member states shall “provide adequate legal 
protection against the circumvention of any effective technological 
measures, which the person concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with 
reasonable grounds to know, that he or she is pursuing that objective.”50 
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2.3 Classification of video games 
As the core of the thesis is the effect of DRM-systems, in particular TPMs, 
attached to video games as copyrighted intellectual work, it is necessary to 
first classify the video game in terms of copyright, as such classification can 
affect the applicable anti-circumvention legislation. 
  
In essence, video games are amalgamations of individual copyrightable 
elements, such as music, scripts, video, paintings and character design, with 
the addition of a computer program on specific hardware which enables 
human interaction with the game. Unsurprisingly, such complex works of 
authorship presents specific legal issues in terms of classification.
51
 Lipson 
and Brain considers three types of creative elements to be included in a 
video game: audio elements (e.g. musical compositions, sound recording 
and voice-acting), video elements (e.g. photographic images, moving 
images, animation and text) and computer code (i.e. source code and object 
code). Additionally, the video game script, plot and other literary works, 
well-developed characters and maps and architectural works, may also be 
eligible for copyright protection. However, these elements are only 
protected if they fulfil the criteria for protection in each jurisdiction.
52
 
 
Since individual elements that comprise a video game can undisputedly 
warrant independent copyright protection, the question at hand is whether 
legal protection is attainable for the video game as a whole, i.e. as a single 
and cohesive intellectual work.
53
 Basically, there are three main modes of 
classification: some jurisdictions considers video games to be 
predominantly a computer program, whilst others consider that video games 
have a distributive classification and consequently the legal protection of 
different individual elements must be found separately in accordance with 
the specific nature of the element, and finally, a limited number of countries 
are inclined to address video games as essentially audiovisual works. 
However, the classification of video games as essentially audiovisual works 
is marginally used, especially within the EU, and is thus of limited interest 
and will not be further examined.
54
 
 
Finally, however likely it may be that a video game can be classified as an 
intellectual work pursuant the InfoSoc Directive, since a computer program 
is a core component of video games, an investigation of the Software 
Directive and its applicability on the subject matter is warranted, and it 
would not be appropriate to dismiss it without investigation. 
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2.3.1 The video game as a computer program 
First and foremost, what is the definition of a computer program according 
to the Software Directive? Even though article 1(1) and (2) regulates the 
object of protection, i.e. computer programs, the term is not clearly 
defined.
55
 This lack of a clear definition was intentional as it allows the term 
to be dynamic and adaptable over time.
56
  Article 1(2) states that the 
directive is applicable to “[...] the expression in any form of a computer 
program”. Additionally, in recital 7 of the preamble, the term computer 
program includes “programs in any form, including those which are 
incorporated into hardware.” Moreover, recital 7 sentence 2 states that the 
term is also applicable to “preparatory design work leading to the 
development of a computer program”, provided that the nature of the 
preparatory work is such that it can result in a computer program at a later 
stage.
57
 However, this does not clearly define what actual elements are 
included in the expression “programs in any forms” - is source and object 
code classified as a computer program and is the graphic user interface 
(GUI) included? In 2010, the case BSA (C-393/09) was published 
concerning the interpretation of article 1(2) of the original Directive 
91/250/EEC, which addresses the question: is the GUI of a computer 
program a form of expression of that program included in the meaning of 
article 1(2)? The article states that: “Protection in accordance with this 
Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a computer program. 
Ideas and principles which underlie its interfaces are not protected by 
copyright under this Directive”. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) concludes that the directive does not define the term “expression in 
any form of a computer program”, but that preparatory design work, which 
can lead to the “reproduction or the subsequent creation of such a program” 
is included.
58
 The court then refers to the directive’s 10th and 11th preamble 
recitals, which state that GUIs provide for interconnection and interaction of 
software elements and hardware with other software and hardware as well 
as with users.
59
 The court further states that the GUI in particular is an 
interaction interface enabling communication between the computer 
program and the user. Since the GUI under these circumstances “does not 
enable the reproduction of that computer program”, the court concludes that 
the interface does not constitute a form of expression of a computer program 
within the meaning of article 1(2) and can therefore not be copyright 
protected specifically under the Software Directive.
60
 However, the court 
states that the GUI can be protected by copyright, assuming it is its author’s 
own intellectual creation, following the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29/EC.
61
 
Consequently, the CJEU separates the copyright protection offered 
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computer program from the copyright attainable by the program’s visual 
expression on screen.
62
 In the SAS Institute case (C-406/10) the CJEU 
expands on the definition of computer program and states that the 
functionality of a computer program and the programming language, i.e. its 
code, as well as the format of data files used to utilise certain functions of 
the program are protected under the Software Directive as expressions of the 
computer program.
63
 In conclusion, the software code inherent in a video 
game does indeed qualify as a computer program in view of the Software 
Directive and the protection for TPMs granted by said directive could be 
applicable. However, this does not tell us whether a video game should be 
regulated under the Software Directive as a computer program or under the 
InfoSoc Directive as an amalgamation of different copyright protected 
works or, indeed, under both. 
 
2.3.2 The video game as a combination of  
individual intellectual works 
As opposed to the Software Directive, the InfoSoc Directive has not defined 
the copyright subject matter and Member States are therefore free to decide 
on their own preferred regime concerning the standards of originality that 
determine copyright protection.
64
 Additionally, the legal protection afforded 
by this directive is not meant to overlap with the protection granted 
technological measures attached to computer programs under the Software 
Directive.
65
 In my view, this implies that both directives should not be 
applied simultaneously to the same element of an intellectual work, whilst it 
seems likely that most parts of a video game can fall within the scope of the 
InfoSoc Directive as it is meant to be applicable to “copyright and related 
rights” in general and a video game certainly have parts which would 
qualify as original intellectual work (for example musical scores, the GUI 
and other on-screen expressions etc). 
 
As far as national legislation is concerned, Sweden is a good example of the 
individual rights approach to video games. In Sweden, works of authorship 
are protected through the “Lag (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och 
konstnärliga verk” (Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works, 
henceforth referred to as the Swedish Copyright Act). According to section 
1, “[...] anyone who has created a literary or artistic work shall have 
copyright in that work, regardless of whether it is: 1) a fictional or 
descriptive representation in writing or speech, 2) a computer program, 3) a 
musical or dramatic work, 4) a cinematographic work, 5) a photographic 
work or another work of fine arts, 6) a work of architecture or applied art or 
7) a work expressed in some other manner”.66 Subsequently, the medium 
used for a literary or artistic work is of limited importance as long as a 
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literary or artistic work is contained within. Although video games are not 
expressly classified in section 1, such work could be protected within 
several of the categories pursuant point 1-6, or under the extensive general 
clause of point 7.
67
 To exemplify, in accordance with section 1 point 2, the 
underlying code of a video game can be granted copyright protection as a 
computer program. Secondly, the visual output of the screen images of a 
video game, e.g. the GUI, can be protected as a cinematographic work. 
According to the Swedish Market Court (MD) case MD 2011:29, a video 
game consists of several different categories of works included in section 1: 
it is protected as a computer program pursuant point 2, a musical work 
pursuant point 3, a cinematographic work according to point 4 and 
audiovisual elements, such as the GUI, are protected under point 7.
68
 
Depending on which category the individual works included in the video 
game adhere to, different rules of the Swedish Copyright Act are applicable 
depending on the classification.
69
 In MD 2011:29, the Swedish Market 
Court concludes that a video game, for the gaming console PlayStation 3, 
attains copyright protection both as a cinematographic work and as a 
computer program.
70
 However, copyright categorisation per se is not 
something which the Swedish Market Court normally concerns itself with, 
as intellectual property law falls outside the jurisdiction of the MD, and 
therefore the ruling is an exception.
71
 Consequently, only very limited 
emphasis can be placed on this particular case in terms of precedence. 
  
2.3.3 Clarification from the CJEU 
The question of how to legally classify video games within the EU, in terms 
of copyright and technological protection measures, and whether the 
Software Directive or the InfoSoc Directive should be applied is not clear 
cut since parts of a video game can fall within the scope of both directives. 
However, the issue at hand has lately been receiving more attention and at 
the moment, more than one case is referred to the CJEU addressing this 
particular issue. The referred case Grund and Others (C-458/13) asks the 
pointed question:  
 
“Does Article 1(2)(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC (1) preclude the application of a 
provision (in this case Paragraph 95a(3) of the UrhG [Gesetz über Urheberrecht und 
verwandte Schutzrechte, Law on copyright and related rights]) which transposes 
Article 6(2) of Directive 2001/29/EC into national law if the technological measure 
in question protects not only works or other subject-matter but also computer 
programs?”  
 
Primary appellant is Anders Grund as administrator in the insolvency 
proceedings of SR-tronic GmbH and the respondent is Nintendo Co. Ltd, 
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Nintendo of America Inc.
72
 The premise is that the two directives are clearly 
separated and article 1(2)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive states that “this 
Directive shall leave intact and shall in no way affect existing Community 
provisions relating (a) to the legal protection of computer programs” and 
subsequently article 6(2) of the InfoSoc Directive does not affect article 7 of 
the Software Directive, both provisions concerning TPMs. Hence, the issue 
which arose for the referring court (the German Supreme Court) was: should 
TPMs protecting hybrid products, in particular video games, fall within 
either the scope of regulation specifically for computer programs or the 
general provisions of copyrighted works within the InfoSoc Directive.
73
 The 
question was referred to the CJEU recently, and the case is still in progress 
and no opinion have yet been issued. 
 
However, concerning a second referred case, the Nintendo v PC Box (C-
355/12), AG Sharpston issued an opinion in mid-September 2013. The 
opinion deals with several important issues directly related to video games 
and copyright protection through DRMs (and TPMs) and it will be 
discussed at length in the following chapter. Concerning the applicability of 
the Software Directive compared to the InfoSoc Directive as regards video 
games, AG Sharpston states that the Software Directive “[...] only concerns 
computer programs, whereas the InfoSoc Directive concerns copyright and 
related rights in intellectual works in general”.74 She then refers to the case 
UsedSoft (C-128/11) which states, in its paragraph 51, that provisions of the 
Software Directive is viewed as lex specialis in relation to provisions of the 
InfoSoc Directive. In her opinion, this statement infers that the Software 
Directive takes precedence over the InfoSoc Directive, but “only when the 
protected material falls entirely within the scope of the former (italics 
added)”. In other words, the Software Directive would be applicable in this 
case if, and only if, the video games in question were considered mere 
computer programs.
75
 AG Sharpston also points out that the protection 
granted against unauthorised acts is slightly more restricted in the Software 
Directive than the protection offered by the InfoSoc Directive. In her 
opinion, where complex intellectual works, comprising inseparably of both 
computer program and other copyrightable elements, are concerned, the 
greater, and not the lesser, protection should be accorded.
76
 In other words, 
if the computer program parts are not separable from the other intellectual 
works, as could be the case with video games as the audiovisual elements 
are inextricably incorporated in the software, then the InfoSoc Directive 
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should be applied as its provisions offers the greater protection. 
Nevertheless, from a strictly legislative standpoint, there seem to be no 
indication in the relevant EU legislation that the applicability of either 
directive, on their respective subject matter, should preclude the 
applicability of the other, especially since the InfoSoc Directive leaves all 
existing EU directives intact. However, in keeping with the AG’s opinion on 
the matter, video games are to be regarded as complex intellectual works, as 
opposed to mere computer programs, and should therefore be awarded the 
greater protection provided by the InfoSoc Directive. Hence, in terms of 
applicable DRM protection regulation, it is the relevant provisions of the 
InfoSoc Directive that will act as a focal point for the remainder of the 
thesis. 
 
2.4 Digital rights management in the EU 
Traditional copyright protection was not built to adequately handle the 
challenge inherent in the new information technology and therefore a new 
form of technology-based copyright protection was developed. The 
beginning of DRM as we know it today was devised as a self-protection 
response, mainly from the music industry, to the illegal sharing of music 
files via the World Wide Web. From a right holder perspective, DRM is 
simply a proportionate self-protection response to the rights protection 
issues which accompanies the all-encompassing copying and sharing 
machine that is the World Wide Web.
77
  
 
Digital rights management is a generic term ultimately describing a 
sophisticated sets of tools, or technologies, for ’the identification and 
protection of intellectual property in the digital form’. One common 
example is when a DRM-system simply encrypts, or scrambles, digital data 
in order to limit access to authorised users holding a decryption key. Other 
DRM-systems allow the end-user to download a specific digital file, for 
example a video, but the content remains decrypted, or simply put 
unwatchable, until the end-user has acquired an individual license which 
unlocks the content on the computer. Even when the end-user has purchased 
the individual license he or she is unable to share it with others – if the 
digital content is sent to another party it will once again be encrypted since 
the license is specifically tied to the purchaser and the utilised device.
78
 
 
DRM is used by digital rights owners, such as video game companies, to 
encrypt the content of a digital file or otherwise restrict access to the content 
and the ability to copy it, as well as to control the manner it is being 
provided to customers. Essentially, right holders aim to remove or restrict 
control of the legitimate copy of the digital content from the end-user in 
possession of it, opting for control to remain with the right holders even 
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after purchase by a customer.
79
 DRM-systems can be divided into two basic 
categories: DRM that utilise TPMs and those that do not. Since an 
increasing amount of DRM-systems relies on TPMs to manage the rights 
attached to digital content the use of the term DRM will, for the remainder 
of the thesis, refer to TPM-enabled DRM-systems.
80
 In terms of TPM, there 
are many different technological protection measures available. Two very 
common TPMs used to identify whether someone is authorised to access 
material are passwords and cryptography, the latter is the science of 
encryption and decryption. As regards video games, using TPMs modelled 
on cryptography is commonplace. Methods have been developed which 
enable encrypted files to be linked to devices, comprised of hardware and/or 
software, so that the encrypted information can only be decrypted using that 
particular device.
81
 Other examples of TPMs are registration keys, that 
requires the end-user to correctly type a registration code, and internet 
product registration, ensuring that a specific video game copy can only be 
installed on one device by verification of an online serial number. Generally 
TPMs can be divided into two groups: ones that control access (access 
control) or ones that control use (copy control).
82
 Hower, many TPMs 
display characteristics of both types. Another common type of DRM 
attached to games is a requirement of online activation when first installed. 
Connectivity to internet, so that the activation can be re-affirmed now and 
then, can also be required and certain games even demand that the user go 
online and stay online while playing. A more subtle form of DRM is the 
type which requires users to create online accounts in order to access all 
parts of the game, in other words users are required to sign up to an online 
distribution platform through which games can be purchased and bound to 
the user’s online account. It provides access to the purchased games to the 
concerned user whilst ensuring that only legitimately bought copies are 
accessible.
83
  
 
The use of DRM-systems is internationally justified by the previously 
mentioned WIPO treaty WCT, and its article 11 is the precursor to article 6 
of the InfoSoc Directive, which requires Member States to provide adequate 
legal protection of TPMs.
84
 Recital 47 of the InfoSoc Directive 
acknowledges that TPMs increasingly will enable right holders to control 
access to and use of works, but also considers that techniques for illegal 
circumvention of such measures will develop at a comparable pace and 
therefore TPMs put in place by right holders needs legal protection.
85
 For 
clarification, circumvention of a TPM refers to the avoidance or removal of 
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a TPM put into place by right holders to prevent or restrict unauthorised use 
of their works.
86
  
 
In legal terms, DRM components are defined either as “effective 
technological measures”, pursuant article 6(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, or 
as “right management information” pursuant article 7(2) of the same 
directive. According to Maziotti, the distinct targets of each article indicate 
that “anti-circumvention protection is afforded each DRM component or 
device in accordance with the task that that the component or device is 
intended to perform within the architecture of a certain system.” Mazziotti 
exemplifies by asserting that components, for example encryption 
technologies, are protected under article 6(3), as such measures enable 
access control and the protection process. Furthermore, Mazziotti claims 
that both articles imply that the circumvention of a DRM-system is illegal 
regardless of whether the purpose of the circumvention is infringing 
copyright or not. Subsequently, the articles, contrary to article 11 of the 
WCT, do not guard the permitted lawful acts, following copyright 
exceptions and limitations, that end-users are to benefit from. 
It prohibits both the single user from circumventing the technology with the 
purpose of engaging in a legitimate free use and the technology provider 
from offering tools enabling decryption, circumvention, alteration or 
removal of DRM components and related information.
87
 
 
However, recital 48 of the directive provides some limit to any further 
extension of protection for TPMs as it requires TPMs to not prevent “[...] 
the normal operation of electronic equipment and its technological 
development” and it also states that TPMs “[...] should respect 
proportionality and should not prohibit those devices or activities which 
have a commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent the 
technical protection” (italics added).88 Further, article 6(1) stipulates that the 
obligation for Member States to provide adequate legal protection for TPMs 
is dependent on the concerned TPMs being effective.
89
 The second sentence 
of article 6(3) stipulates that technological measures are deemed effective 
“where the use of a protected work or other subject matter is controlled by 
the right holders through application of an access control or protection 
process”.90 Both copy control and access-control is included.91 Accordingly, 
there are certain conditions, which TPMs must meet in order to qualify for 
legal protection according to the InfoSoc Directive.  
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3 The Nintendo preliminary 
ruling 
In the case Nintendo v PC Box (C-355/12) the Italian court (the Tribunale di 
Milano) referred two questions to the CJEU for preliminary ruling. The case 
is to date still in progress and the outcome has not yet been finalised. 
However, AG Sharpston recently released her opinion (September 19
 
2013) 
on this case in which she addresses the referred questions and make her 
recommendations. Among the issues addressed are classification of video 
games, as previously discussed in section 2.3.3, and the reach of anti-
circumvention regulation concerning devices that facilitate circumvention. 
 
3.1 Background 
Nintendo is a major developer of video games and gaming consoles.
92
  
The case in question concerns three companies in the Nintendo group 
(referred to as Nintendo) which are suing the Italian company PC Box for 
the production and distribution of devices that can circumvent the TPM that 
Nintendo has put in place in its game mediums as well as in its gaming 
consoles. PC Box markets devices such as ’mod chips’ and ’game copiers’ 
and these devices enable video games other than those designed by 
Nintendo, or independent licensed producers, to be playable on the 
Nintendo consoles.
93
 Nintendo has, to ensure that no unauthorised game 
copies are playable on their consoles, attached encrypted information to the 
video game mediums that needs to be exchanged with encrypted 
information contained within the consoles. Simply put, unless the correct 
encrypted information exists on the medium in which the video game is 
stored, i.e. cartridges for Nintendo DS and DVD’s for Nintendo Wii, the 
game in question will not be playable on the consoles. Authorised producers 
of video games are granted access to mediums with the relevant encrypted 
information already stored.
94
 According to Nintendo, these TPMs are lawful 
and equipped with the legitimate aim of ensuring that only authorised copies 
of Nintendo and Nintendo-licensed games are used with its consoles. 
Nintendo also states that the principal purpose of PC Box’s devices is to 
circumvent these lawful measures.
95
  
 
PC Box on the other hand enquires whether a video game could at all be the 
object of protection in copyright law and, if it is protected, whether a video 
game is to be regarded as a computer program or an intellectual work. 
Furthermore, PC Box claims that it markets original Nintendo consoles with 
a ”software pack comprising applications specifically created by 
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independent producers for use on such consoles in conjunction with mod 
chips or game copiers” designed to disable the built in blocking mechanism, 
or TPM. The purpose is to allow so called ‘homebrews’, i.e. legitimate 
software independently produced, to be playable on the original Nintendo 
consoles. Subsequently, the purpose of the devices is not to facilitate the use 
of illegal copies of original Nintendo video games on their consoles, 
contrary to the claims made by Nintendo. PC Box additionally considers 
Nintendo’s true purpose to be 1) to prevent the use of independent software 
not connected with the illegal video games copies sector and 2) to 
compartmentalise markets (competition law) so that games purchased in one 
geographical sector will not function on a console purchased in another 
sector. Further, PC Box asks whether Nintendo’s application of TPMs to 
both its video game mediums and its hardware, is contrary to article 6(3) of 
the InfoSoc Directive.
96
  
 
For clarification, PC Box’s devices undisputedly circumvent the intended 
blocking effect of Nintendo’s required encrypted information exchange.97 
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Nintendo’s technological measures 
prevent both unauthorised acts and acts that require no authorisation and 
that PC Box’s devices circumvent that blocking in both cases.98 
 
3.2 The referred questions and the AGs 
assessment 
The referring court (Tribunale de Milan) asks two questions: 
“(1)      Must Article 6 of Directive 2001/29/EC be interpreted, including in the light 
of recital 48 in the preamble thereto, as meaning that the protection of technological 
protection measures attaching to copyright protected works or other subject matter 
may also extend to a system, produced and marketed by the same undertaking, in 
which a device is installed in the hardware which is capable of recognising on a 
separate housing mechanism containing the protected works (video games produced 
by the same undertaking as well as by third parties, proprietors of the protected 
works) a recognition code, in the absence of which the works in question cannot be 
visualised or used in conjunction with that system, the equipment in question thus 
incorporating a system which precludes interoperability with complementary 
equipment or products other than those of the undertaking which produces the 
system itself? 
(2)      If  it should be necessary to consider whether or not the use of a product or 
component to circumvent a technological protection measure predominates over 
other commercially significant purposes or uses, may Article 6 of Directive 
2001/29/EC be interpreted, including in the light of recital 48 in the preamble 
thereto, as meaning that the national court must apply criteria which give 
prominence to the particular intended use attributed by the rightholder to the product 
in which the protected content is inserted or, in the alternative or in addition, criteria 
of a quantitative nature relating to the extent of the uses under comparison, or 
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criteria of a qualitative nature, that is, relating to the nature and importance of the 
uses themselves?”99 
 
The AG perceives these two questions as actually constituting three 
questions, the first one being divided into two parts.
100
 According to AG 
Sharpston, the essence of the referred questions is as follows. 
 
3.2.1 First referred question, part one 
The first part ask whether the meaning of technological measures in article 
6(3) of the InfoSoc Directive include both measures physically linked to the 
copyrighted material itself (e.g. cartridges or DVD’s containing the video 
game) and measures linked to devices required to use or enjoy the material 
(e.g. consoles on which the games are playable)?
101
 In answer to this, the 
AG notes that the definition of technological protection measure is broad, 
“[...] any technology, device or component”, and nothing in the wording of 
article 6 in the InfoSoc Directive excludes measures as those in question. 
Additionally, the AG claims that excluding such measures, which are in part 
incorporated in devices other than those that house the copyrighted material 
itself, could potentially deny a broad range of technological measures, 
which the directive aims to protect.
102
 Subsequently, the clear-cut answer to 
the question is yes; the kind of measure at hand qualifies as a TPM in 
accordance with article 6(2), even though the TPMs are also incorporated in 
devices designed to access the intellectual works.
103
 
  
3.2.2 First referred question, part two 
The second part enquire if such technological measures are lawful pursuant 
article 6 if their effect is not merely to restrict unauthorised reproduction of 
copyrighted material, but also to preclude any use of that material with other 
devices or of other material with those devices? In other words, does 
Nintendo’s TPM qualify for legal protection pursuant article 6, even if it 
prevents or restricts unauthorised acts, even if interoperability is also 
restricted and acts that require no authorisation is prevented or restricted 
along with it?
 104
  
According to the AG, a TPM must firstly be deemed effective in accordance 
with article 6(3) to benefit from legal protection pursuant article 6. Thus, 
following article 6(3), the TPM in question must be designed, in the normal 
course of its operation, to prevent or restrict unauthorised acts and it must 
also allow the use of the material to be controlled by the right holder. The 
acts that it must be designed to restrict or prevent must additionally be such 
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acts that requires right holder authorisation in accordance with the InfoSoc 
Directive.
105
 The AG stresses that finding of facts is a matter for the national 
court, but that Nintendo’s TPMs seem likely to be effective, at the very least 
insofar as restricting unauthorised acts is concerned (regardless of whether 
the TPMs in question can be circumvented), and she consequently assumes 
this to be true for the purpose of the following elaboration.
106
 The AG 
continues by emphasising that to the extent that such other effects, e.g. 
restrictions of permitted acts, are generated, the InfoSoc Directive does not 
require that legal protection be awarded the concerned TPMs – on the 
contrary, there is no justification for granting protection for measures that 
restricts acts that require no authorisation.
107
 The AG proceeds by 
highlighting the core of the issue: the difficulty lies in that the TPM that 
restricts acts that requires authorisation is the very same TPM that 
simultaneously restricts acts that do not require authorisation.
108
 As regards 
this, the AG submits that a test of proportionality, referred to in recital 48 in 
the preamble of the InfoSoc Directive, must be applied.
109
 The classic test 
involves determining whether a legitimate aim is pursued, whether it is 
suitable to achieve that aim and whether it does not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve it.
110
 To determine if a TPM is proportionate, the 
national court must examine whether the “desired effect of preventing or 
restricting acts which require the right holder’s authorisation can be 
achieved without also preventing or restricting acts which require no such 
authorisation. In other words, could Nintendo have protected its own or 
licensed games without preventing or restricting the use of its consoles to 
play ‘homebrew’ games?”111 The national court must examine the degree of 
restriction on acts that do not require authorisation: what type of acts are 
restricted and how important is it that such rights are not restricted?
112
 
Regardless of the result of the assessment of the degree of interference, it is 
also necessary to determine whether other measures could have offered 
comparable protection for right holders’ rights, but with less interference.113 
However, the protection must also be considered “in the light of the devices, 
products, components or services against which it is sought”, addressed in 
question two.
114
 
 
3.2.3 Second referred question 
The second question asks whether protection has to be granted, pursuant 
article 6(2), against the supply of PC Box’s devices, due to the fact that they 
allow or enable the performance of such unauthorised acts. The national 
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court wants to know which criteria should be applied when assessing the 
purpose and use of devices (such as PC Box’s) which can circumvent TPMs 
that qualify for protection.
115
 The national court, in the words of the AG, 
“seeks guidance on the relevance of ‘the particular intended use attributed 
by the right holder to the product in which the protected content is inserted’ 
(Nintendo’s consoles) and of the extent, nature and importance of the uses 
of the devices against whose use protection is sought (PC Box’s mod chips 
and game copiers)”.116 
 
Regarding the first aspect of the question, the AG agrees with the national 
court and considers that the particular use intended by Nintendo for its 
consoles is irrelevant to the assessment whether protection should be 
provided against the supply of PC Box’s devices. Instead, what matters is 
whether the latter falls within the scope of article 6(2) and subsequently, it is 
the second aspect, concerning the extent, nature and importance of the uses 
of PC Box’s devices, which must be examined.117 The AG argues that if a 
technological measure qualifies for protection pursuant article 6(2) of the 
InfoSoc Directive, then protection must be offered against the manufacture, 
import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or rental, or 
possession for commercial purposes of the concerned devices enabling 
circumvention. There is however a minimum requirement concerning the 
purpose of the devices: in order for this protection to be activated the 
devices themselves must meet at least one of the following three criteria: (1) 
the devices are promoted, advertised or marketed for  the purpose of 
circumventing the technological measure in question, or (2) have only a 
limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent, or 
(3) are primarily designed, produced or adapted for the purpose of enabling 
or facilitating  circumvention. To clarify, if one of these criteria is met the 
protection is required pursuant the abovementioned provisions, it is only if 
none of these criteria are met that protection is not provided.
118
 According to 
the AG, the referring court seems to have no particular trouble with the 
interpretation of criteria (1) and (3), but apparently, this is not the case with 
criteria (2). Essentially, the question pertains to what criteria should be 
assessed when determining whether PC Box’s devices “have only a limited 
commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent” 
Nintendo’s technological measures.119 
 
Determining the extent to which PC Box’s devices may be used for 
purposes other than allowing copyright infringement is necessary not only 
when deciding whether concerned devices fall within the definition in article 
6(2) of the InfoSoc Directive, but also when evaluating if Nintendo’s 
technological measures meet the required proportionality. If it can be 
ascertained that the primary use of the devices are for such other purposes 
then not only are they not infringing any exclusive right guaranteed by the 
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InfoSoc Directive, but there will also be a strong indication that the 
technological measures are disproportionate. Reversely, if it can be 
established that the primary use of the devices is facilitating infringement of 
exclusive rights there will be a strong indication that the measures are 
proportionate. Subsequently, it will be relevant to make a quantitative 
assessment of the ultimate purposes for which the circumvention occur both 
when determining whether Nintendo’s technological measures qualify in 
general for legal protection and whether protection should be granted 
against the marketing of PC Box’s devices. However, the AG stipulates that 
this assessment is a matter for the national court.
120
  
 
Additionally, as the AG points out, the question of qualitative criteria has 
barely been addressed in the observations to the court though it seems the 
national court envisioned that the importance of allowing Nintendo’s 
consoles to be used for purposes that did not infringe any exclusive rights 
might outweigh the importance of preventing or restricting unauthorised 
acts.
121
 The AG agrees that the implementation of technological measures, 
in some cases more than others, should not interfere with user’s rights to 
carry out acts not requiring authorisation. However, the AG makes the 
reservation that to the extent that these end-user’s rights are not fundamental 
rights, the importance of protecting copyright and related rights must be 
recognised. At any rate, the qualitative criteria should be viewed in light of 
the quantitative criteria discussed, i.e. the relative extent and frequency of 
uses which do enable infringement and those which do not should be 
examined.
122
 
 
In sum, the AG answers the question by suggesting that when determining 
whether protection must be provided against any supply of devices, 
components or products designed to allow access to protected works 
pursuant article 6(2) of the InfoSoc Directive, it is not necessary to consider 
the particular intended use of such devices, products or components 
attributed by the right holder - on the contrary, the extent to which alleged 
circumvention devices, products or components can be used for legitimate 
purposes is a relevant consideration.
123
   
 
3.3 Additional comments by the AG 
Besides answering the two, in actuality three, core questions referred by the 
national court, AG Sharpston makes a few other noteworthy statements. 
As aforementioned in chapter 2, concerning the applicability of either the 
Software Directive or InfoSoc Directive as regards video games, the AG 
initially states that the Software Directive “[...] only concerns computer 
programs, whereas the InfoSoc Directive concerns copyright and related 
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rights in intellectual works in general”.124 As previously mentioned in 
section 2, the AG refers to the case UsedSoft (C-128/11) which states, in its 
paragraph 51, that provisions of the Software Directive is viewed as lex 
specialis in relation to provisions of the InfoSoc Directive. In her opinion, 
this statement infers that the Software Directive takes precedence over the 
InfoSoc Directive, but “only when the protected material falls entirely 
within the scope of the former (italics added)”. In other words, the computer 
program directive would be applicable only if the concerned video games 
were considered mere computer programs. If separate TPMs had been used 
for computer programs and other material then it should have been possible 
to apply each directive to the appropriate TPM.
125
 The AG points out that 
the national court has concluded that the video games in question cannot be 
classified as mere computer programs since they include intellectual works, 
in narrative and graphic form, inextricable from the programs themselves. 
Additionally, AG Sharpston states that the protection granted against 
unauthorised acts is slightly more restricted than the protection offered by 
the InfoSoc Directive. In her opinion, where complex intellectual works 
comprising inseparably of both computer program and other material are 
concerned the greater, and not the lesser, protection should be accorded.
126
 
The AG also addresses the possible applicability of exceptions set out in 
article 5 and 6 for the acts that PC Box’s devices allow. According to AG 
Sharpston, none of the exceptions seems applicable, but she emphasizes that 
this particular issue pertains to the national court’s assessment of facts.127 
 
3.4 Opinions concerning the Nintendo 
preliminary ruling 
The main issue at hand in this particular referral to the CJEU is the scope of 
protection afforded to TPMs under article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive. 
According to the AG, in order for TPMs to qualify for protection pursuant 
article 6 the national court must assess whether the application of the TPMs 
in question complies with the principle of proportionality. The national 
court must therefore consider whether the TPMs can achieve their objective 
without disproportionately preventing or restricting the end-user’s right to 
perform acts which otherwise would have been considered non-infringing, 
for example playing so called homebrew games. The AG also underline the 
importance of determining the ultimate purpose or use of the circumvention 
devices: to what extent can they be used for non-infringement purposes? 
The AG proceeds by stating that if the primary use of said devices was for 
infringing, then it would seem that the TPMs in question are proportionate. 
However, if on the other hand the primary use was for non-infringing 
purposes then the use of TPMs may be disproportionate and subsequently 
not qualify for protection according to article 6. The facts in each case must 
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be established by the national court, which then must assess the 
proportionality based on those facts.
128
  
 
Mihaly Ficsor, member and honorary president of the Hungarian Copyright 
Council and former assistant director general of the WIPO, has a dissenting 
point of view as regards the issue at hand. Initially, he states that the 
obligation to provide adequate protection against circumvention is 
applicable both to access-control TPMs and copy-control TPMs. Nintendo’s 
TPMs seem to incorporate both types and Nintendo’s TPMs thus qualify for 
protection.
129
 It is plain that Ficsor is of a different view than the Advocate-
General since according to him, ‘mod chips’ and ‘game copiers’ are such 
devices that they have nothing to do with devices which have only a limited 
commercial purpose or use other than to circumvent as the concerned 
devices are designed exclusively for the purpose of circumvention. On 
account of this, Ficsor believes that the answer to the second question 
referred should be answered with a resounding ‘No’. The national court 
should not need to consider whether or not the actual use of a device, whose 
purpose is to circumvent a TPM, predominates over other commercially 
important purposes or uses.
130
 Ficsor explains his view by referring to 
recital 48 and article 6(2). Ficsor is critical towards the referring courts 
focus on, and interpretation of, recital 48. In his view, while an assessment 
of proportionality, which the recital demands, is indeed needed, the 
principle of proportionality should not only be applied from the point of 
view of whether or not it is justified to disregard the need for protection of 
TPMs in the particular case. One must also assess whether or not it would 
be proportionate to remove the protection for “the key element of the 
ecosystem of the game industry”. In his opinion, removal of the protection 
of TPMs is to deprive the game industry of an “indispensable means of 
protection against piracy”. Moreover, recital 48 is not the only provision 
offering guidance concerning the proportionality assessment, on the 
contrary: article 6 introduces detailed norms that aim to regulate how the 
protection of TPMs against unauthorised circumvention should be applied in 
a proportionate way.
131
 It is all about striking a fair balance between 
ensuring adequate protection whilst duly recognising legitimate interests of 
third party actors as well as the public interests that justifies certain 
exceptions and limitations. Article 6(2) regulates the scope of devices, 
products or components that are prohibited to manufacture, import or 
distribute. Paragraph 4 of said article then presents exceptions and 
limitations concerning which measures are needed in order to guarantee that 
beneficiaries can indeed enjoy them. However, he claims that beneficiaries 
of exceptions and limitations are not allowed to simply circumvent TPMs – 
preference must first be given to voluntary agreements by the right holders 
and secondly, when such agreements are not applied, the governments of the 
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member states must apply appropriate measures. The proportionality 
principle must also take into account the right holders’ legitimate interests, 
which includes consideration of the interest that adequate protection of 
TPMs is not undermined. Ficsor additionally points out that paragraph 4 
states that any intervention measures applied in member states must not 
exceed “the extent necessary to benefit from exception or limitation”. 
According to Ficsor, this means that if an exception is made to serve 
purposes of a certain group then the TPM may only be circumvented in such 
a way that it is guaranteed that only that group of people can benefit. In 
other words, if an exception is granted for a certain purpose, then the access 
and use facilitated by the intervention measure must be limited to that 
specific purpose.
132
 Furthermore, Ficsor states that the referring courts 
reference to recital 48 in the first question, concerning definition of 
technological protection measures, is not justified since the recital has 
nothing to do with the concept or definition of TPMs.
133
 
 
As regards the second question, Ficsor believes the answer to be clear-cut. 
He states that the proportionality principle stipulated in recital 48 should be 
applied in accordance with article 6. Article 6(2) determines the scope of 
devices, products etc which manufacture and distribution etc is prohibited. 
Three categories are listed in the paragraph prohibiting the production, 
import, distribution etc of devices, products or components which: (a) are 
promoted, advertised or marketed for the purpose of circumvention of 
effective technological measures, (b) have only a limited commercially 
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent such measures or (c) are 
primarily designed, produced, adapted or performed for the purpose of 
enabling or facilitating such circumvention.
134
 ‘Mod chips’ and ‘game 
copiers’ are not only primarily, but specifically and exclusively, designed to 
circumvent TPMs according to Ficsor, who states that they without a doubt 
fall under point (c) of paragraph (2) and subsequently the TPMs should be 
protected against these devices. Consequently, there is no need to evaluate 
whether the devices could fall under point (a) or (b) as well since only one 
of these three criteria needs to be met in order for the protection of the 
TPMs to be activated.
135
  
 
Another scholar, Giorgio Spedicato, comments that AG Sharpston makes an 
interesting point in para. 49-50 of the opinion, essentially stating that no 
legal protection must be granted to TPMs preventing or restricting acts 
which do not require the right holder’s authorisation under the InfoSoc 
Directive. Spedicato argues that, although he welcomes the standpoint, the 
statement is “too easy going” since the wording in article 6(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive differs from its precursor, article 11 of the WCT, in that it 
provides protection for TPMs regardless of whether the prevented or 
restricted acts are permitted by law (either due to falling outside the scope of 
copyright or from benefiting from an exception or limitation to copyright) or 
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not. Consequently, AG Sharpston’s interpretation is more restrictive from a 
right holder perspective and according to Spedicato, this specific statement 
is “more innovative than the AG herself seems to acknowledge, and finally 
puts the InfoSoc Directive back on the tracks marked by article 11 of the 
WCT.” 
 
Spedicato also comments on AG Sharpston’s evaluation of the legitimacy of 
circumvention devices under article 6(2) arguing, not completely in line 
with AG Sharpston’s standpoint, that even though it is relevant to determine 
the ultimate purpose of the concerned device, the assessment of the primary 
purpose of the device must be made on an abstract level, i.e. looking into 
what the device is suitable to do rather than at the factual level examining 
what users do with the devices.
136
 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
In my opinion, one of the most important points that the AG make is that 
TPMs that prevents or restricts acts which do not require right holder 
authorisation are not legally protected under the InfoSoc Directive. Another 
is that when it comes down to deciding whether a device, which can be used 
to circumvent TPMs but also to enable lawful use of independent games (or 
“homebrews”), is indeed unlawful it is a matter of factual proportionality: is 
the device mainly used for unlawful circumvention or not? Clearly, there are 
dissenting voices pertaining to the interpretation of article 6, and the opinion 
of AG Sharpston does indeed seem to cast a new light on the subject matter. 
Sharpston’s point of view represents a slightly new legal direction within 
the EU, one that to a greater degree reflects that DRM, and TPMs, should 
not be allowed to prevent or restrict lawful end-user acts in the name of 
copyright protection: there seem to be a line that must not be crossed. From 
an end-user point of view, this is welcomed news. Notably, Ficsor partially 
disagree with the AG as he recommends a stricter approach favouring the 
right holder interest as regards protection of copyright through TPMs, for 
example by arguing that the alleged circumvention devices in the Nintendo 
preliminary ruling should not be perceived as anything but circumvention 
devices as that the factual uses of the devices should not be considered.  
Another relevant statement the AG makes is the suggestion that video 
games ought to be classified as intellectual works under the InfoSoc 
Directive, regardless of the fact that all video games are inextricably linked 
to a computer program. According to Sharpston, the Software Directive 
should be perceived as lex specialis, but should only be applied to a video 
game if it is considered a mere computer program. Additionally, the AG 
states that computer programs are protected to a lesser degree than those 
intellectual works that fall within the scope of the InfoSoc Directive and as a 
video game is a complex work it should receive the greater protection. 
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4 Are TPMs the solution or part 
of the problem? 
4.1 The Justification of TPMs 
Proponents of the legal protection of TPMs argue that such measures merely 
help maintain the status quo already established by copyright law. 
Opponents respond to this by arguing that it is not preserving status quo – it 
is tilting the balance firmly in favour of copyright holders, and consequently 
it is detrimental to the public interest.
137
 
 
A recurring argument for the use of DRM-systems, and inherently TPMs, is 
that the amount of revenue lost due to illegal access and publishing of said 
content online is staggering.
138
 However, the economic figures supporting 
this claim are contested, as will be discussed shortly.  
 
Proponents of the view that preserving incentives through DRM-systems is 
essential argue that the right to receive remuneration when providing access 
to intellectual works will be essential regardless of possible technological 
changes. This point of view is in certain regards flawed since theories of 
incentive are largely based on presumptions inherent in the business model 
of the former technological generation and therefore new possible 
developments as regards information exchange and distribution are simply 
not considered. Consequently, this viewpoint is inherently limited and due 
to an unwillingness to adapt one could imagine that it runs the risk of 
becoming outdated as well as leading to complacent and non-progressive 
behaviour, especially concerning possible new business models or even new 
forms of unconsidered incentives.
139
 However, this position could be used 
as a basis for an entire new thesis and therefore it is merely mentioned, 
although it is an interesting approach in its own right. 
  
4.2 The Drawbacks of TPMs 
According to Samartzi, TPMs do more than just protect copyrighted works: 
for example, they can limit the end-user’s period of view, restrict the 
number of copies that can be made or put a time-limit on them.
140
 It is 
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evident that TPMs, especially access-control TPMs, can create difficulties 
for legitimate end-users. One such example is when an end-user has 
purchased online access to content that is protected through device binding. 
Device binding, simply put, means that content is bound to a specific device 
and the end-user, which has purchased access, can only access the online 
content from a specific device even though he or she has purchased access 
legitimately. In addition to the inconvenience of not being able to use 
different devices, it also means that if the hard drive of the designated 
device fails and needs replacing the end-user loses all access despite being a 
legitimate user.
141
  
 
Another issue, which accompanies TPMs, is the lack of interoperability 
which is built into some platforms. Essentially, this means that right holders 
can limit the end-users ability to use other digital devices than the content 
providers preferred device since the DRM-protected digital content can be 
prescribed to only work on a particular type of digital device. This particular 
problem is more of a competition law issue, but nonetheless it is a drawback 
with the use of TPMs from an end-user point of view.
142
 Even before the 
modern day legal approach to DRM, i.e. TPMs and RMI, was put in place 
there were those who voiced concerns as to the foreseen lack of 
interoperability, and how frustrating and unacceptable end-users would find 
it.
143
   
 
According to Maziotti, the InfoSoc copyright legislation is unfit to pursue 
an effective enforcement of statutory copyright exceptions with the ever-
increasing implementation of TPMs and other control technologies.
144
  
 
Bhatt states that the use of DRM-systems confines digital media and 
interferes with end-users lawful use of copyrighted works, such as movies 
or music, since TPMs can prevent the end-user from making back-ups of 
legally attained copies. The author also states that the development of 
DRM-systems does not actually stop copyright piracy, but rather is 
disastrous for ’innovation, free speech, fair use and competition’.145 
 
4.3 Are TPMs necessary and de facto  
effective?  
As the abovementioned opposing views of proponents and opponent of 
TPMs suggest, the necessity of utilising TPMs and the de facto 
effectiveness of such measures are debatable. Hence, a presentation of 
certain relevant issues pertaining to this follows.  
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4.3.1 Magnitude of piracy as validation for 
TPMs – the threat exaggerated? 
The need for TPMs is claimed by the game industry to be substantial, 
mainly due to the estimated magnitude of the illegal sharing of video games. 
However, it is quite problematic, from an end-user perspective, that it is 
associations and corporations within the game industry sector itself which 
conducts most studies and produce statistics on video game piracy – the 
game industry can hardly be considered entirely objective. 
Indeed, a recent study
146
 highlights that despite the current substantial 
interest in video game piracy there is surprisingly little objective 
information available, particularly as regards its magnitude. This study was 
conducted by monitoring the BitTorrent peer-to-peer sharing protocol and 
the sample included 173 games and was collected for three months, late 
2010 to early 2011. 
147
 According to the researchers, BitTorrent was chosen 
primarily because it is regarded as one of the main channels for online 
piracy and the de facto standard for distribution of digital files via peer-to-
peer network.  The study shows that of 173 game titles, 127 was available 
on BitTorrent and approximately 12.6 million unique peers accessed the 
files under the three months period, indicating the prevalence of game 
piracy via distribution based on BitTorrent.
148
 They conclude that there is a 
notable discrepancy between the figures produced in their study and the 
figures presented by international game industry associations, such as the 
Entertainment Software Association (ESA). For example, the ESA claimed 
that 9.78 million illegal downloads of approximately 200 game titles had 
occurred - in December 2009 alone.
149
 The implication being that the 
information provided by game industry associations can be questioned as 
being not entirely objective nor fully accurate, but rather tends to exaggerate 
the actual extent of digital game piracy.
150
  
 
Another critical voice is Cvetovski, who also criticises the lack of neutrality 
and proper empirical research which he argues is evident in some reports by 
industry associations. For example, the report ‘The impact of internet piracy 
on the Australian economy’, which was commissioned by the Australian 
government and relied on heavily by the popular media industry, presents 
alarming statistics: in 2010 no less than 4.7 million Australian internet users 
accessed online content illegally, the annual retail value lost to Australian 
content industries was $900 million and an excess of 8000 jobs were lost in 
the content industries sector as a result of internet piracy. However, the 
methodology used to reach abovementioned conclusions was based on data 
                                                 
146
 Drachen, A, Veitch, R & Bauer, K, Digital Game Piracy: Analyzing the Illegal 
Distribution of Digital Games via BitTorrent, in Lugmayr, A, Franssila, H, Safran, C & 
Hammouda, I, (eds), Proceedings of the 15th International Academic MindTrek 
Conference: Envisioning Future Media Environments, MindTrek 2011. Association for 
Computing Machinery, New York, pp. 233-240., 2011, (Drachen et al.). 
147
 Drachen et al., p. 1.  
148
 Drachen et al., p. 7. 
149
 Drachen et al., p. 2. 
150
 Drachen et al., p. 1 and 7. 
 39 
collected from previous studies on five European nations and Cvetovski 
argues that it is difficult to see “how objective and reliable conclusions 
might be reached” when the data primarily relied on were secondary sources 
from an unrelated study. Cvetovski suggests that little weight should be 
attached to such non-neutral and non-objective reports and that one could 
regard these reports as mere PR exercises aiming to influence attitudes 
without real evidence to back up the claims.
151
 Moreover, Cvetovski even 
goes so far as to call it a fallacy to perceive copyright industries as victims: 
the video game industry alone generate an estimated US$ 42 billion globally 
(as at 10 July 2011) and contributed almost US$ 5 billion to the US gross 
domestic products in 2009. The industry representatives however still 
claims that the sheer magnitude of piracy is so large that the entire 
community is hurt.
152
 
 
In my opinion, this is of relevance since a part of the ongoing debate on the 
de facto need for TPMs and their protection is based on the presupposed 
magnitude of the piracy problem. Even though the magnitude of video game 
piracy might be exaggerated, the fact that pirated versions of video games 
are being illegally shared to a non-dismissible degree does not change. 
 
4.3.2 TPMs: end-user justification for 
infringement? 
When discussing video game piracy, Electronic Arts (EA) game title 
‘Spore’ is generally mentioned since it is viewed as the most pirated game at 
its release in 2008. The game utilised a TPM called SecuROM, which limits 
the number of devices it can be installed on by the legitimate end-user to 
three as well as requiring internet connection each time the end-user want to 
play.
153
 Once the prescribed three uses are up, the end-user can only install 
it on another device through contacting EA by phone to obtain verification 
and authorisation. Because of the use of such a limiting DRM-system, parts 
of the gaming community was fuming and began to encourage others to 
download the illegal versions with the aim of demonstrating discontent to 
the game developers. Despite the TPM, or, as some claim, indeed because of 
the TPM, it only took ten days for the pirated version shared online to be 
downloaded no less than 500.000 times across various peer-to-peer 
networks. Over time the number of illegal downloads just kept rising (from 
early September to early December 2008 it was downloaded 1.7 million 
times) effectively making the game the most illegally downloaded game of 
2008.
154
 The response from EA to these, and other, negative end-user 
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reactions was to relax the terms of the DRM to allow more use and even 
relax the DRM terms on one planned future product.
155
  
 
In my opinion, it is unlikely that Spore would have been illegally 
downloaded to such an extent in such a short time unless parts of the 
gaming community had not decided to act in order to demonstrate their 
discontent. Subsequently, the possibility that restrictive DRM may actually 
contribute to an increase in video game piracy, rather than act as a deterrent 
should be recognised. 
  
It is also quite clear that parts of the targeted end-users are not happy with 
the limitations that DRM-systems pose on the way they can use the legally 
obtained video game copy. Indeed, some express the view that they are 
being treated as potential infringers rather than valued customers. To some it 
is a matter of principle: they accept no DRM restrictions on the video game 
copy as they perceive themselves as legitimate owners, not licensees.
156
   
 
It seems that even though DRM-systems are viewed as legally effective, and 
thus qualifies for protection in accordance with article 6 of the InfoSoc 
Directive, the reality seem quite different. Based on the amount of illegal 
consumption of video games, in spite of attached DRM-systems, it does not 
seem as TPMs, are de facto effective in preventing piracy. 
 
4.3.3 End-user empowerment and the co-
dependency of game developers 
Cvetkovski proposes that digitalisation has lead to a convergence of 
illegitimate and legitimate behaviour as regards popular media consumption. 
Customers (or end-users) of today are equipped with the tools to challenge 
the manner and form of product delivery. In fact, Cvetkovski believes it to 
be very likely that certain consumers simultaneously access material legally 
and illegally, without really considering the consequences. Cvetovski argues 
that this reflects the ignorance and prevalent attitudes, which, to a certain 
extent, explains the purposed magnitude of illegal accessing to copyrighted 
material today according to him. Cvetovski also purposes that genuine 
consumer discontent plays a part in the illegitimate consumption.
157
 Further, 
organised piracy, Cvetovski claims, is generally deemed criminal and 
inappropriate by consumers whilst individual piracy is morally acceptable 
and merely opportunistic. This coupled with the perceived constraints and 
arbitrary power of corporations and government regulators creates an 
attitude that to an extent justifies illegal consumption in the eyes of the 
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consumers, consequently making it very difficult to curb.
158
 Indeed, 
Cvetovski argues that the copyright governance policies currently used 
needs to be critically examined because of the overall lack of success in 
stemming the flow of illegal consumption.
159
 Indeed, according to the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), there is no evidence that DRM helps 
combat copyright infringement online, no matter how ardently corporations 
claim that DRM is necessary.
160
 The material that I have examined does, if 
not outright support, at the very least not contradict his position and, as has 
been discussed above, consumer discontent does seem to contribute to 
illegal consumption. 
 
Additionally, certain stakeholders within the game industry, concerned 
about the loss of sales and keeping good will and consumer support, are 
paying heed to the discontented end-users. For example, when Microsoft 
initially presented its new gaming console Xbox One earlier this year it was 
revealed that several constraints of the DRM kind had been put in place, 
such as a daily online authentication requirement and restrictions to pre-
owned sales. The response from the gaming community was 
overwhelmingly negative, mainly because the planned DRM would restrict 
and prevent acts which, up until that point, had been allowed gamers and 
was essential parts of the gaming experience according to the end-users. 
Due to this feedback from the end-users, Microsoft decided to remove all of 
the contested DRM restrictions saying, and I quote, "You told us how much 
you loved the flexibility you have today with games delivered on disc. The 
ability to lend, share, and resell these games at your discretion is of 
incredible importance to you. Also important to you is the freedom to play 
offline, for any length of time, anywhere in the world." Basically, end-users 
made it clear that they would not support these constraints and Microsoft 
chose to adapt to their wishes.
161
 Another example is that the renowned 
polish game developer CD Projekt Red recently announced in an open letter 
to the community that there will be no DRM whatsoever attached to the PC 
version of the upcoming third installation of the Witcher game series, an 
announcement that was met with approval and encouragement from the 
gaming community.
162
 When asked about why this decision was made 
Marcin Iwinski, co-founder of CD Projekt Red, said: “We pay for a type of 
protection (DRM) that requires users to go through a series of authenticating 
measures, then it fails to work, while the pirated version is actually more 
user-friendly, easier for gamers to deal with.” According to Marcin Iwinski, 
the word “user-friendly” is the key and the game industry needs to “[...] 
educate the consumer and [...] create a myriad of easy, extremely user-
friendly and legal ways to buy content.”163 However, it needs to be pointed 
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out that the abovementioned opinions do not represent a consolidated game 
industry viewpoint.  
 
4.4 Concluding remarks 
DRM-systems does not seem to be truly effective when it comes to actually 
preventing piracy – indeed some scholars suggest that intrusive DRM might 
actually increase the magnitude of video game piracy. However legally 
sound it may be to allow, or even encourage, the use of DRM in video 
games, there remains one big issue: DRM-systems are far from unbeatable 
and most TPMs put in place are quickly circumvented. Essentially, this 
means that even though DRM-systems are theoretically an effective way to 
protect copyrighted works and prevent or restrict piracy, it does not seem to 
be de facto effective.  
 
Additionally, it seems the end-users have quite a bit of influence on the 
development of games today, including what level of DRM is deemed 
acceptable. I cannot help but think that today’s level of communication and 
cooperation between game developers and would-be consumers are made 
possible partly because of the ease with which would-be consumers can get 
their hands on free, illegal video game versions if they so desired, making it 
even more important for game developers to develop games that consumers 
will appreciate enough to want to support and consequently pay the full 
price for. From an end-user perspective, the rapid technological 
development and subsequent easy access to illegal consumption has worked 
in their favour, strengthening their position.  
 
The solution to the particular problem of video game piracy does not seem 
to be as simple as rigorously enforcing DRM-systems through legislation, 
but rather to address the issues and attitudes that leads many otherwise 
lawful citizens to obtain illegal copies of video games – for example the 
inconvenience and restrictiveness attached to most DRM, often making it 
easier to deal with a pirated version. In this regard, DRM could be 
considered part of the problem rather than the solution. 
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5 Conflicting fundamental 
rights and DRM-systems 
Until recently, EU law did not expressly incorporate any reference to human 
rights, but the CJEU has confirmed multiple times that it nonetheless 
regards itself as bound to the principles expressed in the ECHR. In addition, 
the main principles of human rights protection are part of international 
customary law as jus cogens, thus having binding effect regardless of 
whether they have been expressly codified or not.
164
 The enactment of the 
EU Charter also codifies principles from the ECHR and invests competence 
in the CJEU to adjudicate on alleged violations of human rights in parallel 
to the ECtHR.
165
 
 
According to the European Commission, protecting intellectual property 
rights in an online environment is part of the ‘Digital Agenda’ and it is 
therefore desired to achieve balance between the right holder’s copyright 
and the end-user rights. Furthermore, the author’s right to his or her own 
intellectual property is a fundamental right, but so is the public’s right to 
freedom of expression and information.
166
 Subsequently, in trying to protect 
the property rights of the right holder by restricting available actions of the 
end-user, an apparent risk of ensuing conflict between the two fundamental 
rights arises and presents a problem: is the exercise of the right of property 
interfering with the right to freedom of expression and information and, if 
so, what may the outcome be? 
  
5.1 Right of property 
Pursuant article 1 of the first protocol to the ECHR, the right to property is 
protected as a fundamental right. It states that: “Every natural or legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possession. No one shall 
be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law.”167 In light of the ECtHR case law, the term ‘possession’ entails “an 
autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of physical 
goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be 
regarded as ‘property rights’ and thus as ‘possessions’”168 and the ECtHR 
accordingly interprets the term widely. As further clarified in the case of 
Anheuser-Busch Incl. v Portugal, which concerns a trademark dispute, 
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intellectual property is undoubtedly included in the right to property 
pursuant article 1 as the court states that: “Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is 
applicable to intellectual property as such”.169  
 
In the EU Charter, the right to property is expressed in article 17: 
 
”Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully 
acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject 
to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may 
be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.”170 
 
In comparison, this article is more detailed in its description of the right to 
property than that of the ECHR and the fact that intellectual property is 
included is expressly stated in the second part of the article.
171
 
Consequently, the right holder’s copyright is considered a fundamental right 
according to both the ECHR and the EU Charter. 
 
5.2 Freedom of expression and 
information 
Freedom of expression is the right to actively communicate one’s thoughts 
or creative works.
172
 Article 11(1) of the EU Charter stipulates that the right 
of freedom of expression and information, to which everyone is entitled, 
includes “freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers”. Subsequently there exists, on an EU level, a fundamental right to 
spread, exchange and receive information without any public authority 
interfering.
173
  
 
The ECHR emphasises the right of freedom of expression, including 
freedom of information, in its article 10(1). The wording is to a large degree 
identical to article 11(1) of the EU Charter and according to the ECtHR, the 
term “expression”174 include all expression, regardless of its form.175 The 
fundamental right is elaborated upon in article 10(2), or rather the limits of 
the right are. Article 10(2) states that: “The exercise of these freedoms, since 
it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and 
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are necessary in a democratic society [...] for the protection of  the 
reputation or the rights of others” (italics added). The right to freedom of 
expression can subsequently be lawfully restricted as long as it is prescribed 
in law and is “necessary in a democratic society”176, the interpretation of 
which will be discussed in section 5.4. 
 
5.3 The tension between copyright and 
freedom of expression 
In early 2013, the ECtHR issued judgement in the French case Ashby 
Donald v France
177
 that specifically addressed the tensions between 
copyright law and the freedom of expression.
178
 The court clarified that a 
conviction due to copyright infringement, because of illegally reproducing 
or publicly communicating copyrighted material, can be regarded as an 
interference with the right to freedom of expression and information 
pursuant article 10 of the ECHR. The court concluded that it is no longer 
sufficient to justify a sanction, or any other judicial order, restricting the 
artistic or journalistic freedom of expression solely on the basis that a 
copyright law provision has been infringed. Through this case, the ECtHR 
have asserted that article 10 of the ECHR is indeed applicable whenever a 
copyright case interferes with the right of freedom of expression and 
information – in other words an external human rights perspective has been 
added to the justification of copyright enforcement.  However, a wide 
margin of appreciation was granted member states in this particular case, 
effectively making the impact of article 10 minimal.
179
 The court stated that 
the unauthorized publication of copyrighted fashion pictures online, which 
the case revolved around, was not related to an issue of general interest for 
society, but instead had a “commercial speech”-character. Such speech, 
messages, pictures and content that are merely money driven do not enjoy 
the protection guaranteed by article 10, according to the court. This in 
conjunction with the fact that the two conflicting fundamental rights need to 
be carefully balanced called for a wide margin of appreciation and on these 
grounds the ECtHR concluded that there was no violation of article 10 of 
the convention.
180
 This case confirms that copyright enforcement, 
restrictions on the use of copyrighted works and sanctions pursuant 
copyright law is to be regarded as interfering with the right of freedom of 
expression and information. The question is then ultimately if the concerned 
interference is justifiable and whether a fair balance is struck between the 
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conflicting fundamental rights.
181
 In addition, according to Akester, one 
possible interpretation concerning the freedom of expression is that since 
the precursor to article 10 of the ECHR is article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the ECtHR, when in doubt, 
must make sure that the interpretation of article 10 of the ECHR is made in 
the light of article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 19 includes the right to seek 
information and ideas within the scope of freedom of expression. Akester 
therefore believes that attempts to regulate internet, in order to protect 
copyright, may jeopardise freedom of expression.
182
 Moreover, the ECtHR 
has addressed the issue of freedom of speech in context of intellectual 
property before, specifically concerning advertising regulations,  and the 
ECtHR found that the right to free speech is not only applicable to political 
statements and similar statements, but to commercial expressions as well.
183
   
 
As regards copyright protection interfering with fundamental rights, it 
seems appropriate to briefly discuss the case Scarlet Extended v SABAM (C-
70/10), which expressly addresses the following question: is it acceptable 
pursuant the fundamental rights of freedom of expression and information 
for right holders to impose an injunction upon internet service providers 
(ISPs) obliging the ISPs to monitor the activity of its internet users, identify 
files that right holders claim are their intellectual property, determine which 
files are unlawfully shared and finally block such unlawful file-sharing?
184
 
Since this type of preventive monitoring would require “active observation 
of all electronic communications conducted on the network of the ISP 
concerned”, it would oblige the ISP to monitor all the data relating to each 
of its customers.
185
 According to the court, the effects of the injunction 
might indeed infringe the fundamental rights of the ISPs customers as 
regards their right to protection of personal data and their freedom to receive 
or impart information pursuant articles 8 and 11 of the EU Charter.
186
 The 
court states that the injunction could undermine freedom of information 
since the monitoring system might not “distinguish adequately between 
lawful and unlawful content”, possibly resulting in lawful communication 
being blocked.
187
 Consequently, the court held that, in relation to the 
customers, requiring the ISP to utilise the monitoring system would not 
result in achieving the required fair balance between the right to intellectual 
property and the freedom of expression and information as well as the right 
to protection of personal data. On these ground the court decided that such 
an injunction was precluded.
188
 However, one must bear in mind that there 
is a difference between installing a comprehensive internet monitoring 
system and attaching DRM-systems, for example copy protection, to a 
specific copyrighted work. Nonetheless, certain aspects are of relevance: the 
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CJEU stated that, in context of adopted measures protecting copyright 
holders, “[...] national authorities and courts must strike a fair balance 
between the protection of copyright and the protection of the fundamental 
rights of individuals who are affected by such measures”.189 In my view, it 
does seem to indicate that whether or not a restrictive system prevents not 
only unlawful use, but also lawful use, is of importance to the assessment. 
On that note, it is also possible that the previously discussed opinion of the 
AG
190
 could be of relevance in the context of conflicting fundamental rights 
and the legitimacy of TPMs. The TPMs must, as stated previously, be 
proportionate
191
 and the test of proportionality is comprised of three 
conditions that need to be determined: (1) the measure must pursue a 
legitimate aim, (2) it must be suitable to achieve that aim and (3) it must not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim.
192
 According to the AG, 
the first condition is met, (the aim is even encouraged by the legal 
protection provided by article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive), and the second 
condition of suitability is a question for the concerned national court, insofar 
that it must determine whether the degree of restriction provided by the 
measure results in effective protection of unauthorised acts.
193
 The prevalent 
issue following the third condition is highlighted by the AG: “The difficulty 
lies in the fact that the same measures prevent or restrict acts which do 
require authorisation and those which do not.”194 According to the AG, the 
question boils down to whether Nintendo could have “protected its own or 
licensed games without preventing or restricting the use of its consoles to 
play ‘homebrew’ games” or not, i.e. whether the desired effect of the TPMs 
used could be achieved without preventing or restricting acts which do not 
require authorisation.
195
 Accordingly, if Nintendo could have achieved the 
desired protection without restricting legitimate use, then the TPMs should 
not be legally protected pursuant article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive. In my 
view, this interpretation seems to recognise the end-user right of freedom of 
expression and information to a greater degree than before, making the new 
interpretation less favourable towards the right holder’s right of property as 
it questions the legitimacy of the restrictiveness of the DRM-systems 
utilised. One could possibly even argue that the reservation the AG put 
forward, that to the extent that these end-user’s rights are not fundamental 
rights, the importance of protecting copyright and related rights must be 
recognised
196
, indicates e contrario that where end-user fundamental rights 
are concerned, they are  to be awarded importance. The AG also stresses the 
importance of the purpose of and factual use of a circumvention device, 
such as a ‘mod chip’, which facilitate circumvention. In my opinion, AG 
Sharpston’s interpretation is less favourable to copyright holders than end-
users since it entails that a circumvention device could be considered lawful 
if the primary purpose and use of the device is lawful. The emphasis that the 
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AG places on the factual purpose of ‘circumvention devices’, as opposed to 
stressing the fact that it can circumvent DRM-systems, and the factual 
legitimate uses of the concerned devices seem to be a step towards a more 
fair balance between the concerned conflicting fundamental rights. 
 
5.4 Article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive 
As stated in recital 3 of the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive, the proposed 
harmonisation in said directive will help to ”implement the four freedoms of 
the internal market and relates to compliance with the fundamental 
principles of law and especially of property, including intellectual property, 
and freedom of expression and the public interest.”197 Accordingly, the 
directive is designed to increase harmonisation and guide the 
implementation of fundamental freedoms such as the right of property and 
the right to freedom of expression. 
 
According to article 6(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, member states must 
provide adequate legal protection against circumvention of effective 
technological measures. This includes circumvention devices or services 
according to article 6(2). However, article 6(4) requires member states to 
ensure that technological measures do not prevent end-users from enjoying 
the benefit of copyright exceptions. In terms of what exceptions and 
limitations are to be provided for in national law, article 6(4) stipulates that 
they should be in accordance with the provisions of article 5.
198
 Examples of 
such exceptions are “use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or 
scientific research”199 and “use for the purposes of public security or to 
ensure the proper performance or reporting of administrative, parliamentary 
or judicial proceedings.”200 But when, exactly, must member states act? To 
what degree must the end-user be able to enjoy the benefit of copyright 
exceptions? Is it only necessary to act when beneficiaries are not able to 
benefit at all, or are member states obliged to act when benefit of exceptions 
exists, but is conditioned or qualified in some way, i.e. if the benefit of 
exceptions are sub-optimal? An example of such sub-optimal benefit of 
exceptions would be if an end-user would suffer inconveniences, delays, 
expenses or similar issues if he or she exercised the exception. Alternately, 
there could be a complete inability to exercise the exception. An example of 
that would be if a student needed to access the original digital version of a 
video game in order to study its interactivity since the derived version does 
not contain the information needed to perform the study. Samartzi argues 
that if technological measures impose such inconvenience that it is 
practically impossible to use works in accordance with the purposes granted 
by the exceptions, then the benefit of the exception is not merely sub-
optimal, but a denial of the exception.
201
 Furthermore, Akester makes a 
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valid point in stating that DRM systems cannot easily cater for public 
concerns such as copyright exceptions and limitations. Akester also stresses 
that it seems impossible for DRM-systems to flawlessly incorporate fair use 
concepts since such concepts are difficult to define and differ from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
202
  
 
Akester also comments on article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive stating that 
since article 6(4) is only applicable to article 6(1) and not to 6(2), member 
states are indeed required to allow for circumvention of specified lawful 
excepted uses, but this is not applicable to circumventing devices or 
services. In Akester’s view, this means that even when such devices or 
connected services would enable users to benefit from exceptions in article 
6, the manufacturing or dealing with them would still be unlawful
203
, 
contrary to the interpretation indicated in AG Sharpston’s opinion in the 
Nintendo preliminary ruling. Altogether, Akester argues that right holders 
can fail to provide the beneficiaries of the exceptions specified in article 
6(4) with the means for benefiting from those exceptions and additionally 
that they cannot get their hands on lawful devices that enables 
circumvention of TPMs so that they can benefit from said exceptions. 
Consequently, DRM systems can clearly interfere with the right to freedom 
of expression, pursuant article 10 of the ECHR. Such interference is not 
justifiable according to article 10 unless it is prescribed by law, pursues at 
least one of the legitimate aims listed in article 10(2) and is ”necessary in a 
democratic society” to achieve concerned aim or aims. As regards the 
requirement that it be prescribed by law, a citizen must be able to reasonably 
foresee the consequences of any action, and unless national legislation has 
left a very wide margin of interpretation to concerned domestic courts, the 
ECtHR would be able to conclude that the interference was prescribed by 
law. Secondly, the aim of DRM-systems is to protect the rights of others, 
which is one of the legitimate aims specified in article 10. Concerning the 
final demand that the interference be necessary in a democratic society, 
Akester points out that the ECtHR considers the freedom of expression to be 
an essential foundation of any democratic society and that even though there 
are exceptions to this freedom, the ECtHR interpret them strictly. Moreover, 
Akester state that in light of case law, the use of “necessary” indicates a 
“pressing social need”.204 Additionally, according to Bonadio it is essential 
to determine whether such restriction is really useful to meet the purposes of 
copyright, the verification of which he believe to be a necessity in order to 
decide whether the imposed restrictions are “necessary in a democratic 
society” in accordance with article 10(2).205 Akester continues by stating 
that member states certainly have margin of appreciation as regards the 
assessment of whether such a need is present and that ultimately the ECtHR 
must conclude whether the interference was “proportionate to the legitimate 
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aim pursued” and whether the reasons presented by the national court are 
“relevant and sufficient”. 
  
Additionally, Akester state that the European case law implies that public 
interest in the speech is highly relevant for the assessment and that it is 
likely that freedom of expression will be favoured in those cases where right 
holders utilise restrictive DRM-systems whilst not ensuring that 
beneficiaries actually benefits from the exceptions in article 6(4).
206
 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
It seems that scholars agree that DRM-systems, including TPMs, as a means 
to exercise the right of property can be said to interfere with the right of 
freedom of expression and information. Case law also supports this 
interpretation. As regards DRM-systems, e.g. TPMs, some scholars claim 
that they neither adequately assure that beneficiaries of copyright limitations 
and exceptions benefit from them, nor adequately distinguish between 
restricting acts that requires authorisation, i.e. protecting the right of 
property in accordance with copyright law, and acts that do not require 
authorisation, i.e. acts that should be allowed in line with the freedom of 
expression and information. For instance, in the case Scarlet Extended v 
SABAM it is stated that the intrusive internet monitoring DRM-system 
concerned constituted interference and it is suggested that it could be 
considered a violation, but the court concludes that it was not due to the 
wide margin of appreciation awarded member states. In sum, there seem to 
be consensus regarding the fact that DRM-systems can interfere with the 
right of freedom of expression and information, but so far relevant EU case 
law does not consider the particular interference of DRM-systems a 
violation. However, current case law does not seem to entirely preclude the 
possibility that it could be considered a violation of fundamental rights.  
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6 Conclusions 
The primary purpose of the thesis was to investigate the anti-circumvention 
law within the EU pertaining to DRM-systems, in particular TPMs, attached 
to video games and examine the de facto effect and effectiveness, focusing 
on conflicting interests of right holders and end-users. The secondary aim 
was to examine the potential interference of such DRM-systems/TPMs from 
a fundamental rights perspective. The following questions were to be 
answered: 
 
1. How do TPMs affect end-users and are TPMs de facto effective? 
2. Can the use of DRM-systems, in particular TPMs, interfere with 
end-users’ fundamental right to freedom of expression and 
information, and, if so, is it considered a violation or not? 
 
Firstly, video games are amalgamations of different intellectual works and 
there are three main modes of classification: 1) as mainly a computer 
program, 2) as a mainly an audiovisual work and 3) viewing the different 
elements as separate and individual intellectual works. As far as EU 
Member States are concerned, the most relevant classifications are as a 
computer program and as individual intellectual works. Full harmonisation 
is not yet achieved within the EU and regulations differ between 
jurisdictions. 
 
In terms of the applicable EU anti-circumvention law, either the Software 
Directive, applicable on computer programs, or the InfoSoc Directive, 
applicable on intellectual works in general, could potentially be applied. 
Further, there does not seem to be any provisions within the legislation that 
indicates that the application of either precludes the applicability of the 
other, insofar as they are applied on their respective, separate subject matter, 
and do not overlap. Indeed, the InfoSoc Directive leaves all existing 
directives intact. However, as the audiovisual and other parts of a video 
game are often inextricable from the computer program element, it may be 
difficult to clearly separate the elements. Also, one and the same TPM 
generally protects the intellectual work elements of a video game as a 
whole, not just the one part that is, for example, the computer program, thus 
making it difficult to apply the two different ant-circumvention directives 
simultaneously. To classify the video game as a whole as either a computer 
program or a complex intellectual work is therefore desirable, although the 
regulation itself does not provide a clear-cut answer. However, AG 
Sharpston, in her opinion on the Nintendo preliminary ruling, addresses the 
classification issue and argues that a video game should not be considered a 
mere computer program as it is comprised of a variety of intellectual works, 
thus making it more than a mere computer program, and that it consequently 
is appropriate to classify it as an intellectual work under the InfoSoc 
Directive as that directive offers the greater protection. The AG also 
highlights that the Software Directive should be considered lex specialis, 
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and should as such precede the InfoSoc Directive, but only as regards mere 
computer programs without additional copyrightable features. In keeping 
with the opinion of the AG, the complex nature of video games indicate that 
they should be accorded the greater protection awarded by the InfoSoc 
Directive and consequently said directive is applicable concerning DRM-
systems attached to video games. DRM is a term describing a combination 
of electronic management and content protection that utilises technological, 
organisational and other means to control the use of digital works. In the 
context of video games, DRM-systems are used by right holders to control 
access to and use of the copyrighted material even after a copy of it has been 
legitimately purchased by an end-user. For example, by utilising electronic 
copy protection or encrypted information exchange as well as limiting the 
number of times, or the number of devices on which, a video game can be 
installed. Essentially, DRM-systems are utilised by right holders to protect 
and manage the copyright attached to video games and, in legal terms, a 
distinction is made between TPMs, pursuant article 6, and RMI pursuant 
article 7. Basically, the term TPM refer to technological protection measures 
that restrict or prevent the use of and access to copyright protected digital 
media content on electronic devices with such technologies installed, whilst 
the article 7 describes RMI as any electronic “information provided by right 
holders which identifies the work or other subject matter, the author or any 
other right holder, or information about the terms and conditions of use, [...] 
and any numbers or codes that represent such information”. Article 6 and 7 
are referred to as anti-circumvention provisions, prescribing that certain 
DRM-systems are lawful under given conditions and must be provided with 
adequate legal protection, i.e., circumvention of lawful DRM-systems is 
illegal. Examples of TPMs are registration keys, prompting the end-user to 
correctly type a series of specific letters or numbers when installing or 
running the video game, internet product registration, requiring an online 
serial number registration ensuring that a specific copy of a video game can 
only be installed on one device, and the use of encryption, ascertaining that 
only authorised and legitimate uses of the work is allowed.  
 
As mentioned above, TPMs restrict or prevent end-users available actions 
and in doing so creates restrictions and inconveniences for the legitimate 
end-user. In fact, pirated versions of video games are often more user-
friendly than legitimate versions, which, unsurprisingly, is a thorn in the 
side of lawful end-users. Proponents of TPMs argue that such systems are 
necessary to protect the copyright attached to works in the modern day 
digital era and that the lack of such adequate protection of copyright 
would/could be detrimental to innovation and creativity, as copyright is 
viewed as a core incentive. The sheer magnitude of piracy and illegal 
consumption is also used to validate the use of TPMs as a countermeasure, 
and the presented figures on revenue loss are staggering.  
 
Opponents on the other hand, question not only the factual effectiveness of 
current DRM-systems to achieve the abovementioned goals, but also doubts 
the validity of studies and figures that proponents rely upon regarding the 
magnitude of piracy and illegal consumption. Opponents argue that the 
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material is often wrongly interpreted and that the figures regarding revenue 
loss attributed to piracy are not nearly as staggering in reality. Additionally, 
many of the studies are commissioned and/or performed by right holders, 
casting doubt as regards objectivity, particularly as certain recent and more 
impartial studies indicate that some figures in earlier studies are 
exaggerated. Concerning the de facto effectiveness of TPMs to combat 
piracy and protect attached copyright, there is little evidence to suggest that 
it is factually effective as studies show that most video games are pirated 
and illegally shared regardless of attached TPMs. Moreover, some scholars 
claim that TPMs, contrary to its purpose, actually contributes to video game 
piracy as end-users, individually or collectively, express their discontent by 
deliberately choosing to circumvent TPMs, share illegal reproductions or 
simply use available pirated versions. Additionally, end-users do not tend to 
view individual circumvention of video game copyright as a real crime and 
uses the intrusiveness and encumbrance that TPMs entail to defend 
infringement. In light of this, the current forms of TPMs cannot be said to 
be de facto effective in terms of preventing copyright infringement, and 
there are some evidence that suggests that the use of TPMs might even 
exacerbate the problem. However, it cannot be ruled out that DRM-systems 
might temporarily slow down the process of illegally accessing copyrighted 
content, even if it is just for a day. To summarise, TPMs often restrict both 
unlawful and lawful actions of end-users, limits interoperability and creates 
other inconveniences for end-users, whilst at the same time not being de 
facto effective as evidence suggest that TPMs are often quickly 
circumvented, thus not adequately combating piracy. 
 
Secondly, the use of TPMs on video games is also interesting from a 
fundamental rights perspective, as a conflict between fundamental rights can 
be said to occur between the right holder’s right of property, pursuant article 
1 of the first protocol of the ECHR and article 17 of the EU Charter, and the 
end-user right of freedom of expression and information, following article 
10 of the ECHR and article 11 of the EU Charter. TPMs restricting the 
access to and the end-users lawful and unlawful use of a video game can 
thus be considered as interfering with the fundamental rights of end-users, 
as indicated/supported by case law.  
 
A regards the possible justification for such interference with fundamental 
rights, article 10(2) of the ECHR states that: “The exercise of these 
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject 
to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society [...] for the protection of  the 
reputation or the rights of others” (emphasis added). As protecting the 
(copy)right of others is a legitimate aim according to article 10 of the ECHR 
the right to freedom of expression can subsequently be lawfully restricted as 
long as it is prescribed in law and is “necessary in a democratic society”.207 
Unless there is a particularly wide margin of appreciation in the national 
legislation, the requirement of the restriction being prescribed in law is not 
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likely to pose a problem and subsequently it is the third condition which 
warrants further examination. The choice of the word “necessary” refers to a 
“pressing social need” and in order to assess if such a need exists for the 
concerned interference, one must evaluate whether or not the interference is 
proportionate.  
 
In the case Scarlet Extended v SABAM the use of a intrusive internet 
monitoring system, that an ISP was required to use vis-a-vis its end-users, 
was precluded as the court believed that it could undermine freedom of 
information since the monitoring system might not “distinguish adequately 
between lawful and unlawful content”, possibly resulting in lawful 
communication being blocked. The court concluded that such a system 
would not achieve the goal of fair balance between the right to intellectual 
property and the freedom of expression and information. However, even if 
the injunction was precluded, the court decided not to label the interference 
a violation, in part because of the wide margin of appreciation which is 
awarded member states. However, the ECtHR considers the freedom of 
expression and information to be an essential foundation of any democratic 
society, implying that said fundamental right is especially important.    
 
As regards the case Ashby Donald v France, the ECtHR concluded that it is 
not sufficient to justify a judicial order restricting the freedom of expression 
and information solely based on the infringement of copyright. The case 
concerned the unauthorised act of publication of copyright protected fashion 
pictures online and the court discussed the commercial speech-character of 
the pictures, as opposed to the general interest-character, concluding that 
content that it is merely money-driven does not enjoy the protection 
guaranteed by article 10 ECHR. In light of this, the ECtHR concluded that 
there was no violation of article 10 of the ECHR. As video games are 
generally regarded as entertainment with commercial value, it is close to 
hand to classify video games as merely money-driven content, although 
there is room for debate on this. Assuming that the concerned video game is 
classified as merely money-driven content, then the end-users of video 
games consequently has a diminished right of freedom of expression and 
information in this context. Accordingly, a TPM can be viewed as 
justifiable, or at least as not entailing a violation, even though it interferes 
with end-user fundamental freedoms. However, the ECtHR concluded that 
the fact that the concerned fundamental rights need to be carefully balanced 
calls for a wide margin of appreciation for member states, effectively 
leaving significant leeway for member states to decide in the matter.  
 
Additionally, although the previously discussed opinion of AG Sharpston is 
not legally binding, it is still an indication of a suggested legal route within 
the EU placing greater emphasis on upholding end-user rights. It seems to 
me that the AG recognises that there is a need for a slightly more cautious 
approach as regards restrictions on other rights in the name of copyright 
protection. Further, Sharpston stresses the necessity of applying the 
principle of proportionality as regards restrictions of lawful acts otherwise 
available to the end-users and Sharpston argues that TPMs that restrict or 
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prevent end-user acts permitted by law are not provided protection in 
accordance with article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive. However, Sharpston also 
highlights that the fact that one and the same TPM often restrict both 
unlawful and lawful acts presents a problem, and she argues that the 
national court must consider the degree of interference caused by the TPM 
and determine whether the TPM is proportionate to achieve the legitimate 
aim or whether it goes beyond what is necessary for that purpose. 
 
Ultimately, TPMs as an expression of the right to property can interfere with 
the right of freedom of expression and information of end-users. Although 
relevant case law is not showing any confirmed violation of the freedom of 
expression and information, it is not unimaginable that it may in the future. 
In light of the fact that TPMs not only seem to be de facto ineffective, at 
combating piracy and protecting copyright, as well as being cumbersome for 
end-users, but also considered as interfering with the fundamental rights of 
end-users (violation or no violation), TPMs in its current form do not seem a 
preferable solution, although further research is warranted. 
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Supplement A 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society  
 
Article 6 
Obligations as to technological measures 
1. Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the 
circumvention of any effective technological measures, which the person 
concerned carries out in the knowledge, or with reasonable grounds to 
know, that he or she is pursuing that objective. 
2. Member States shall provide adequate legal protection against the 
manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental, advertisement for sale or 
rental, or possession for commercial purposes of devices, products or 
components or the provision of services which: 
(a) are promoted, advertised or marketed for the purpose of 
circumvention of, or 
(b) have only a limited commercially significant purpose or 
use other than to circumvent, or 
(c) are primarily designed, produced, adapted or performed for 
the purpose of enabling or facilitating the circumvention of, 
 any effective technological measures. 
3. For the purposes of this Directive, the expression "technological 
measures" means any technology, device or component that, in the 
normal course of its operation, is designed to prevent or restrict acts, in 
respect of works or other subject-matter, which are not authorised by the 
rightholder of any copyright or any right related to copyright as provided 
for by law or the sui generis right provided for in Chapter III of Directive 
96/9/EC. Technological measures shall be deemed "effective" where the 
use of a protected work or other subject-matter is controlled by the 
rightholders through application of an access control or protection 
process, such as encryption, scrambling or other transformation of the 
work or other subject-matter or a copy control mechanism, which 
achieves the protection objective. 
4. Notwithstanding the legal protection provided for in paragraph 1, in 
the absence of voluntary measures taken by rightholders, including 
agreements between rightholders and other parties concerned, Member 
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States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that rightholders make 
available to the beneficiary of an exception or limitation provided for in 
national law in accordance with Article 5(2)(a), (2)(c), (2)(d), (2)(e), 
(3)(a), (3)(b) or (3)(e) the means of benefiting from that exception or 
limitation, to the extent necessary to benefit from that exception or 
limitation and where that beneficiary has legal access to the protected 
work or subject-matter concerned. 
A Member State may also take such measures in respect of a beneficiary 
of an exception or limitation provided for in accordance with Article 
5(2)(b), unless reproduction for private use has already been made 
possible by rightholders to the extent necessary to benefit from the 
exception or limitation concerned and in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 5(2)(b) and (5), without preventing rightholders from adopting 
adequate measures regarding the number of reproductions in accordance 
with these provisions. 
The technological measures applied voluntarily by rightholders, 
including those applied in implementation of voluntary agreements, and 
technological measures applied in implementation of the measures taken 
by Member States, shall enjoy the legal protection provided for in 
paragraph 1. 
The provisions of the first and second subparagraphs shall not apply to 
works or other subject-matter made available to the public on agreed 
contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access 
them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
When this Article is applied in the context of Directives 92/100/EEC and 
96/9/EC, this paragraph shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
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